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Preventive Confinement: A Suggested
Framework for Constitutional Analysis
Alan M. Dershowitz*
A science fiction writer once created a machine called a sanity
meter that automatically gauged a person's potential for dangerous
conduct.' The meter, installed in all public places, registered from
zero to ten. A person scoring up to three was considered normal; one
scoring between four and seven, while within the tolerance limit, was
advised to undergo therapy; one scoring between eight and ten was re-
quired to register with the authorities as highly dangerous and to bring
his rating below seven within a specified probation period; anyone
failing this probationary requirement, or anyone passing the red line
above ten, was required either to undergo immediate surgical alteration
or to submit himself to the academy-a mysterious institution from
which no one returned. The meter was not a diagnostic machine: it
measured solely the intensity of an individual's potential for harm, not
its underlying cause or amenability to treatment. Since the machine
never erred, everyone in the society knew everyone else's danger rating
and acted accordingly. Its widespread use finally succeeded in elimi-
nating crime and other social evils.
Although our society is not yet blessed with such a wonderful,
error-free device, we do have people who claim the ability to gauge an
individual's potential for harm. Indeed, the majority of persons cur-
rently confined in American institutions are there, at least in part, be-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1959; LL.B.,
Yale, 1962. This article is an expanded and slightly revised version of the 1973 Will
E. Orgain lecture, which Professor Dershowitz delivered at the University of Texas
School of Law on March 14, 1973.
1. R. SHECKLEY, The Academy in PIIGRIMAGE TO EARTH 120-40 (Bantam 1957).
1277
Vol. 51:1277, 1973
cause of a prediction of their potential for harm.2 It is appropriate to
ask, therefore, whether the Constitution permits confinement of some-
one because of a prediction that he may engage in harmful conduct at
some future time. While no Supreme Court decision has directly
answered that broad question, individual justices have addressed it.
For example, Justice Robert Jackson, sitting as Circuit Justice, ob-
served that the "jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated
but as yet uncommitted crimes" could not be reconciled with "tradi-
tional American law."3 Similarly, Lord Justice Denning of the Queen's
Bench observed about British law that "[i]t would be contrary to all
principle for a man to be punished, not for what he has already done
but for what he may hereafter do."4
Leading scholars of the criminal law have also inveighed against
preventive confinement. Francis Wharton, for example, argued in his
influential Treatise on Criminal Law that
[i]f the [preventive] theory be correct, and be logically
pursued, then punishment should precede, and not follow,
crime. The State must explore for guilty tendencies, and
make a trial to consist in the psychological investigation of
such tendencies. This contradicts one of the fundamental
maxims of English common law, by which not a tendency
to crime, but simply crime itself, can be made the subject of
a criminal issue.'
For every admonition against preventive confinement, however,
there have been equally authoritative pronouncements supporting the
practice. No less an authority than Blackstone praised preventive con-
finement as "an honor. . . to our English laws . . . since preventive
justice is, upon every principle or reason, of humanity, and of social
policy, preferable . . . to punishing justice . . . . "'I Holmes, too,
2. In 1960, 1,887,000 residents of the United States were classified as inmates
of institutions. Of these, only 346,000 were incarcerated in correctional institutions,
while fully 630,000 resided in mental hospitals. U.S. BuaRnu oF THE CENSUS, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF Tim UNrIED STATES: 1971 Table 52, at 41 (1971).
3. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (Jackson, Circuit Justice,
1950), aff'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Justice Jackson made this sweep-
ing observation in affirming an extension of bail pending appeal to defendants who
had been convicted of conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the government
and who, the Government maintained, might "be expected to" cause "[girave public
danger" if allowed to remain at liberty. Id.
4. Everett v. Ribbands, [1952] 2 Q.B. 198, 206 (C.A.). The Lord Justice made
this generalization in deciding that the English provision for sureties of the peace
required proof of "something actually done" in the past by the person to be confined,
rather than a bare prediction of future harm.
5. F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2 (12th ed. 1932) (footnote omitted).
6. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *251 (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
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echoed this view. In a celebrated passage from The Common Law he
argued that "prevention" is the "chief and only universal purpose of
punishment," and that "probably most English-speaking lawyers would
accept the preventive theory without hesitation."' Nor is the acceptance
of preventive confinement limited to Western lawyers. A Justice of
the Burma Supreme Court observed that "[p]reventive justice, which
consists in restraining a man from committing a crime which he may
commit but has not yet committed, is common to all systems of juris-
prudence .. ."s
Much of the disagreement among these distinguished authorities
stems from the generality of their statements. Preventive confinement
and its variants, such as preventive justice and preventive detention,
are not self-defining concepts. They include a widely divergent
variety of confinement mechanisms. For example, the term "preventive
detention," as used in the contemporary United States, generally refers
to denial of pretrial release to an allegedly dangerous defendant a-
waiting trial for a crime.9 In England, on the other hand, the same
term generally refers to the portion of a convicted recidivist's prison
sentence that exceeds the term normally imposed for the offense it-
self.10 Blackstone's "preventive justice" referred to an ancient practice
-still employed in several of the United States-whereby a person who
has committed no crime, but who has given rise to suspicion that he
may commit a crime, could be preventively confined upon failure to
obtain sureties to keep the peace." These devices all have a preventive
cited as BLACKSTONE]. Blackstone was referring to the same surety provision that
Lord Denning later construed to require "something actually done." Everett v. Rib-
bands, [1952] 2 Q.B. 198 (C.A.). Although Blackstone would have required some
"just ground of apprehension," he differed with Denning, concluding that sureties were
"intended merely for prevention, without any crime actually committed by the party
." 4 BLACKSTONE at *252.
7. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43, 46 (1881).
8. Manng Hla Gyaw v. Commissioner, [1948] Burma L.R. 764, 766.
9. Use of this term in the United States became particularly widespread in con-
nection with the pretrial release and detention provisions of the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE §§ 23-1321 to -1322
(1970). See N. BASES & W. McDoNALD, PREvENTivE DETENTION IN THE DISTICT
OF COLUMBIA: THE FIRST TEN MONTHS (1972); Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LrB. L. REV. 289 (1971).
For other provisions restricting or revoking pretrial release, see TEx. CONST. art.
I, § 1la; Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1577(D) (Supp. Aug. 1972); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 27, § 6161 (Supp. 1972).
10. See Regina v. Higginbotham, [1961] 3 All E.R. 616 (Crim. App.).
11. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952). The
Statute of 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1360-1), authorized justices of the peace to "take of
all them that be not of good fame" a surety to keep the peace. The Pennsylvania
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component in common, but they raise different issues of policy and
constitutionality. It is imperative to sound analysis--especially consti-
tutional analysis-that the broad issue be broken down to its component
parts.
Blackstone provides a useful starting point for this process of
atomization with his astute, if overstated, observation that "if we con-
sider all human punishments in a large and extended view, we shall
find them all rather calculated to prevent future crimes, than to expiate
the past."'" Broadly conceived, most punishments are designed, at
least in part, to prevent future crimes-the preventive component
being a matter of degree. Put another way, preventive confinement
is a continuum. At one pole is the purely preventive system against
which Wharton inveighed: the "psychological" exploration for crim-
inal "tendencies" designed to identify and confine the potential crimi-
nal at the earliest possible stage in his life. From the Bible's to the
Italian positivists' 4 to the Gluecks, 15 there have been those who have
advocated preventive measures-from preventive execution to remedial
education-against persons who had not yet committed formally pun-
ishable acts, but who were predicted to become criminals. At the
other pole is the convicted criminal's sentence of imprisonment. Al-
though formally imposed as punishment for his past crime, it has the
important effect of preventing future crimes, at least during the sen-
tence. Between these terminal points on the preventive continuum lie
a wide variety of confinement mechanisms embodying different com-
ponents of prevention.
A recent judicial exchange between the Chief Judge of the D.C.
Circuit and the current Chief Justice of the United States illustrates the
desirability of viewing preventive confinement as a continuum rather
than an absolute concept. The debate between these two distinguished
jurists turned, at least in part, on whether the challenged practice could
common law that developed under this statute allowed a judge to require a "bail to
keep the peace" even after a person was acquitted of an offense. The court held
the statute, on its face, to be contrary to both the Pennsylvania and the United States
Constitutions.
12. 4 BLACKSTONB, supra note 6, at *252-53.
13. Deuteronomy 21:20-21 (King James).
14. Cesare Lombroso claimed to have identified "a group of criminals, born for
evil, against whom all social cures break as against a rock . . . ." He proposed "to
eliminate them completely, even by death." C. Lolmioso, CaiM, ITS CAUsEs AND
REmmDIES 447 (1918). Enrico Ferri also wrote of the born criminal and proposed
"capital punishment to these unfortunates . . . since they are a continual danger for
society . . . ." E. FEEm, CRJAuNA. SOCIOLOGY § 338 (1917).
15. E.g., S. & E. GLurcK, UNRAVELmN JUVENILE DELmQUmNCY (1950).
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properly be labeled "preventive detention." In Cross v. Harris6
Chief Judge Bazelon sought to construe the District of Columbia sex-
ual psychopath law to avoid the constitutional questions that would be
raised if it were interpreted to authorize preventive detention. "Incar-
ceration for a mere propensity," he argued:
is punishment not for acts, but for status . . . In essence,
detention for status is preventive detention.
Only a "blind court" could ignore the intense debate, in
and out of Congress, over the extent to which the Constitu-
tion can tolerate preventive detention ....
. . . . Confinement for a mere propensity is preventive
detention. Particularly when the act in question is commonly
punishable only by a short jail sentence, indefinite confine-
ment, even though labeled "civil," is preventive detention with
a vengeance. If required by the Sexual Psychopath Act, it
would raise . . . many difficult constitutional issues .... 11
Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger, dissenting, disputed Judge
Bazelon's characterization of the statute as "preventive detention:"
This is not a case where an individual is being commit-
ted solely because of an imagined propensity to engage in
anticipated conduct obnoxious or offensive to others; thus
* . I do not think we are confronted with a situation
involving strictly preventive detention. Appellant's record
stipulation that he recently engaged in . . . acts of indecent
exposure supplies the basis for commitment to one of the in-
stitutions designated by Congress. A civil commitment sta-
tute is not rendered constitutionally suspect as a form of pre-
ventive detention simply because in a given case the civil
confinement may exceed the sentence which could be imposed
under a criminal statute for the same acts.18
Thus both judges seemed to agree that the constitutionality of the sta-
tute turned, at least in part, on whether it authorized "preventive de-
tention." They disagreed over whether confinement that rested in part
on past acts and in part on propensities toward future acts could prop-
erly be characterized as "strictly preventive detention." Neither judge,
however, sufficiently recognized that "preventive detention" is not a
self-defining or self-limiting category. It is an imprecise label that de-
scribes a continuum of devices authorizing intervention at various stages
in order to prevent future harm.
16. 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17. Id. at 1102-03 (footnotes omitted).
18. Id. at 1109 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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I. Past Acts and Potential Harm
There are a number of logical ways of grouping the mechanisms
of preventive confinement.19 Chief Justice Burger's Cross dissent sug-
gests the most obvious: whether the confinement rests "solely" on a
"propensity to engage in anticipated conduct,"20 or whether it rests on
past acts. But this distinction greatly oversimplifies the issue. Vir-
tually all predictive determinations depend, to some degree, on an as-
sessment of the past. It is a truism that the past is the best predictor
of the future. Confinement decisions are no exception: most rest,
in whole or part, on assumptions about what the individual did in the
past.2 ' The critical issue, therefore, is not whether any past act under-
lies the preventive confinement-some past act almost always does.
The issues are more complex, relating to the nature of the relationship
between the past acts and the confinement. Sometimes the formal
criteria for confinement require that the past act be defined in advance
as a crime; other situations require no prior definition. Sometimes
the past act must be formally proved; in other instances it will merely
be presumed. Sometimes the past act must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt; other situations require only that some other de-
cisionmaker-judge, probation officer, or psychiatrist-be "satisfied."
The relationship between the duration of confinement and the nature
of the proved past act also varies. In some situations the nature of the
act alone determines the length of confinement. In others, the act
establishes only the limits of confinement; its actual duration depends
on either predictive considerations or assumptions about other sus-
pected past acts. In still other situations the past act serves merely
to confer jurisdiction-to trigger the state's power to deprive the indi-
19. The manner in which the confinement purports to prevent crime could provide
one basis for grouping. Wartime national security detention, for example, merely
erects a wall between the detainee and others; it does not attempt to reduce inherent
dangerousness. The detention of material witnesses, for example, and of those who
might jump bail is also intended merely to prevent departure. Other mechanisms seek
to alter the detainee's propensity to engage in anticipated conduct through personality
modification, education and training, threats, etc. This "treatment" is sometimes used
to justify confinement-e.g., "He won't take his pills unless he's an in-patient." Such
affirmative aims have constitutional relevance for some authorities. See, e.g., Cross
v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, I., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Other possible continua include the extent to which confinement is voluntary or
involuntary, the extent to which it involves deprivation of liberty, the extent of depri-
vation of liberty without confinement, and the duration of confinement.
20. 418 F.2d at 1109-10 (emphasis in original).
21. In some situations individuals have been preventively detained because of as-
sumptions based on their status rather than their acts. Even these assumptions,
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vidual of his liberty; the duration of confinement depends primarily
on predictive considerations.22
Despite the complex relationship between the past acts and the
duration of confinement, it is possible to construct a continuum that
reflects the degree to which the duration of the confinement is based
on past acts. As with all continua, an infinite number of points could
be identified. For the purposes of analysis, however, three points will
be considered: confinement that requires no prior act; confinement
based on suspicion of a prior act; and confinement that, while requir-
ing proof of a prior act, exceeds the duration normally associated with
a criminal conviction for the same conduct.
A. Pure Prevention
Our society has only infrequently confined individuals who were
neither proved to have committed some past crime nor suspected of one.
The most striking example of pure preventive detention in our national
experience was, of course, the internment of 110,000 Japanese-Ameri-
cans at the beginning of World War H. All Japanese-Americans-a
group defined exclusively in blood terms-who lived in specified areas
were detained without regard to their prior actions, loyalties, citizen-
ship, or age. The avowed reason for the detention was explicitly pre-
ventive: to provide "every possible protection against espionage and
. . . sabotage .... ,23 When this assumed danger abated, however,
the preventive rationale changed: the Government attempted,
though ultimately without success, to justify continued detention to
prevent "community hostility against persons of Japanese ancestry.
24
however, rest largely on suspicion of past acts. See Amsterdam, Federal Consti-
tutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnox-
iousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205
(1967). Racial assumptions, such as those that underlay the confinement of Japanese-
Americans during World War II, constitute a striking exception. See A. BoswoRTH,
AammcA's CONCENTRATION CAM's (1967); R. DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS U.S.A.:
JAPANESE AMmucANS AND WORLD WAR II (1972).
22. See generally Hruska, Preventive Detention: The Constitution and the Con-
gress, 3 CREIGnTON L. REv. 36, 52-57 (1970). For an informative discussion of inde-
terminate sentencing, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 86-103 (1973). See also
Dershowitz, The Indeterminate Sentence as a Mechanism of Preventive Confinement
(to be published by the Ninth Congress of Comparative Law, Teheran, Iran, Sept.
1974).
23. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942).
24. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
Throughout history countries have taken preventive action, including administra-
tive detention, during periods of war or national emergency. The British and French,
for example, had extensive systems of preventive detention during both World Wars.
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The measure taken against the Japanese-Americans differed from
other national security detentions because it confined an entire racial
group without regard to individual past acts. Although the Supreme
Court gave weight to the judgment of both the military authorities
and the Congress that some of the Japanese-American population were
disloyal, it did not require the Government-at least initially-to sep-
arate the loyal from the disloyal. Rather, it found that the warmaking
branches of government might have believed "that in a critical hour such
persons could not be readily isolated and separately dealt with . .. .
It therefore sustained the broad, nonselective, racial detention as nec-
essary to prevent "a menace to the national defense and safety."2 5
In so doing, the Court made two implicit leaps from the require-
ment of a past act as a basis for confinement, one of which even the
dissenters appeared willing to make. The dissenters implied that they
might have approved confinement of selected individuals based on an
"inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition toward the United
States."2  There is, of course, an enormous distance between "loyalty
and good disposition," on the one hand, and "espionage and sabo-
tage" on the other. The group of disloyal and poorly disposed, how-
ever defined, probably would include some potential spies and sabo-
teurs, but surely it would also include many who would not act on
their loyalties and dispositions. The other leap, which the dissenters
rejected, was from national origin to loyalty and disposition. Though
the Constitution arguably protects loyalties and dispositions (at least
when unaccompanied by overt acts), they are within the individual's
The United States also detained some persons of Italian and German ancestry living
on the east coast during World War II. Israel, Ireland, and the Phillipines currently
employ such systems against suspected terrorists. See Hearings on Preventive Detention
and the Bail Reform Act of 1969 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1170-74 (1970); U.N. Doe.
E/CN. 4/826/REV. 1 (1964); Trechsel, The Reasonable Duration of Preventive De-
tention, 4 HumAN RIGHTS: J. OF INT'L & CoMP. L. (Fr.) 119, 150-51 (1971). These
detention systems differ, however, from the one directed against the Japanese-Ameri-
cans because they only authorize detention of persons suspected of hostile association
or dangerous activities. The Emergency Detention Act similarly permitted "detention
of persons who there is reasonable ground to believe probably will commit or con-
spire with others to commit espionage or sabotage' during a declared "internal
security emergency." Emergency Detention Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, §§
101(14), 102, 64 Stat. 1019 (repealed 1971). Although this statute, like other emer-
gency regulations, employed purely preventive criteria, Congress explicitly designed it
to use against persons suspected of past acts that could not, for one reason or another,
support a criminal conviction. Id. § 101(9); see H.R. REP. No. 2980, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1950).
25. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
26. Korematsu v. United.States, 323 U.S. 214, 226 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing).
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control; despite the Gilbert and Sullivan ditty about the sailor who
chose to be an Englishman,2r national origin is not.
The confinement of Japanese-Americans during World War 11
presents a dramatic example of pure preventive confinement. There
are other examples, though perhaps none provides as clear an instance
of pure preventive confinement. While the majority of confined juv-
eniles probably have committed, or are suspected of having committed,
criminal or nuisance acts, a significant number of the young persons in
institutions today are suspected of no past delinquencies. They are
confined because of the inadequacy of their home situations.2" These
children are preventively confined in a "pure" sense. The preventive
rationale is multifaceted. In part, confinement serves merely to shift
custody from the family to the state. It constitutes a convenient al-
ternative to a nonexistent or inadequate family; if a foster family were
available, confinement might terminate. In this sense, the preventive
aspect of the confinement is limited to the child's exposure to the ele-
ments and the world that society deems him incapable of confronting
outside a structured environment. In another important respect, how-
ever, the confinement is designed to prevent the child from becoming
a delinquent or a criminal. This conception dates from the early nine-
teenth century, well before the development of the juvenile court. Beau-
mont and de Tocqueville described the dual function of the "houses of
refuge" in 1833:
The houses of refuge are composed of two distinct ele-
ments: there are received into them young people of both
sexes under the age of twenty, condemned for crime; and
also those who are sent there by way of precaution, not
having incurred any condemnation of judgment ....
The individuals, who are sent to the houses of refuge with-
out having been convicted of some offense, are boys and
girls who are in a position dangerous to society and to them-
selves: orphans, who have been led by misery to vagrancy;
27. W. GILBERT, H.M.S. Pinafore, Act I1 (Boatswain's Song), in PLAYs AmD
POEMS OF W.S. GILBERT 131 (Random House 1932).
28. See In re Ganlt, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.14, 76 & n.6 (1966). Both the majority
and Justice Harlan cite figures indicating that 26% of cases involving approximately
600,000 children brought before juvenile courts in 1965 dealt with conduct that would
not be criminal for an adult. Although some of these children may be suspected
of delinquency, many are not-some 48% in 10 special studies of children in detention
homes or jail awaiting trial. For a full discussion of the studies that developed these
figures see Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Vhy Treat in a Cor-
rectional System?, 31 FED. PRoB. 26, 27 (1967).
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children, abandoned by their parents and who lead a dis-
ordered life; all those, in one word, who, by their own fault
or that of their parents, have fallen into a state so bordering
on crime, that they would become infallibly guilty were they
to retain their liberty .... 29
The confined insane constitute another "mixed" category that in-
cludes some persons who have (or are suspected of having) commit-
ted past harmful acts and some who have not. The statutes governing
the criteria for commitment of the mentally ill generally speak in
purely predictive terms: "likely to cause injury to himself or others,"3 0
or "in danger of causing physical harm to himself or others."31  They
do not formally require any past criminal or otherwise harmful act,
and although past acts of a harmful or disturbing nature may trigger a
significant number of commitments, some are not triggered in that way.
They are purely preventive in the sense that they are based almost en-
tirely on a psychiatric diagnosis that purports to predict future harmful
conduct.
The case of Bong Yol Yang32 provides a striking example of rela-
tively pure preventive confinement of the mentally ill. Bong, an ob-
viously psychotic forty-one year old American of Korean ancestry, ap-
peared at the White House gate asking to see the President or one of his
representatives about people who were "revealing his subconscious
thoughts." As far as the record shows, Bong had never been arrested
or suspected of any crimes; nor was it a crime to ask to see the Presi-
dent or one of his representatives. A psychiatrist testified that, al-
though there was no "evidence of his ever attacking anyone so far," a
possibility always existed that "if his frustrations . . . became great
enough, he may potentially attack someone . . . . " The psychia-
trist also feared that at some future time he might attempt suicide, al-
though there was no evidence of any past attempt.
Bong's involuntary confinement was thus relatively pure pre-
vention: though it was triggered by the act of appearing at the White
House, it was based on a psychiatric diagnosis and prediction. Like-
wise, a large number of mentally ill persons currently confined in men-
29. G. DE BAUMONT & A. DR TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS AI'PLICATION IN FRANCE 137-38 (Lantz ed. 1964).
30. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547, § 27 (Supp. 1972).
31. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 123, § 1 (Supp. 1973).
32. In re Bong Yol Yang (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1964), excerpted in J. K Tz, J. GOLD-
STEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 493 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as KATZ, GOLDSTEIN & DERSHOWITZ].
33. Id. at 494.
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tal hospitals are there on purely preventive grounds. As with juve-
niles, the grounds of the confinement are multifaceted: some are con-
fined for custodial purposes-merely to prevent them starving or other-
wise succumbing to the elements; others are confined for therapeutic
purposes-to prevent them from becoming any sicker and to help them
recover; still others are confined for purposes of isolation-to prevent
them from engaging in predicted conduct that might be harmful to
themselves or others.
Two other categories of pure preventive confinement that affect
a small number of persons warrant brief mention. First, since the
beginning of recorded history society has medically quarantined per-
sons infected with contagious diseases. The leper colony is perhaps
the oldest form of medical confinement, and leporasoria still exists in
many parts of the world, including this country. Tuberculosis sani-
taria also dot the American landscape, and a number of state statutes
still permit confinement of persons afflicted with "active" or "contag-
ious" tuberculosis.34 The law also still mandates and sometimes en-
forces home quarantine-though less frequently than in earlier gen-
erations.3 5 Although in some cases the statute requires that the
diseased person intentionally must have acted in a way that created an
unwarranted risk of exposure to others, this type of confinement is
generally preventive in the pure sense.3"
The final category warranting inclusion in this illustrative cata-
logue is the confinement of material witnesses-a practice authorized at
common law and under many American statutes. Under this practice
a court may confine "one whose only connection with a [criminal] case
is that he happens to know some material fact in relation there-
to . . . . ,,37 The court may confine a witness on the basis of a pre-
34. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAF'ETY CODE § 3285 (West 1970).
35. E.g., TExAs SANrrARY CODE, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477, §§ 7, 8
(1966).
36. The quarantine concept is currently being used metaphorically to justify the
confinement of drug addicts who are thought to be spreading an epidemic of addic-
tion. See generally Dershowitz, Constitutional Dimensions of Civil Commitment, in
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA & DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AmERICA: PROB-
LEM IN PERSPECTIVE, Appendix, vol. 4, at 397 (2d Report 1973). Drug addicts are
not sick in the same sense as tuberculars, nor do they spread their disease in the
same way. For another current use of the quarantine concept, see Schulder & Good-
man, The Public Health Law as Preventive Detention, The Village Voice, Jan. 4,
1973, at 24 (discussing the quarantining of prostitutes allegedly to examine for possible
venereal disease).
37. Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463, 468, 69 S.E. 582, 584 (1910). See also
Hurtado v. United States, 93 S. CL 1157 (1973); Barry v. United States ex rel. Cun-
ningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
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diction that he will flee the jurisdiction rather than appear at trial. This
prediction need not be based on any past act and is sometimes based
solely on the witness' lack of "roots" in the community.3 8
These are some examples of pure preventive confinement. They
all share a significant preventive component, though some have other
purposes as well; they all share an absence of any formal requirement
of a prior voluntary or culpable act or of any suspicion that the past act
in fact was committed. Other than these common points, however, the
purely preventive mechanisms differ significantly in purpose, effect,
duration, and justification.
B. Actual Suspicion
A more common form of preventive confinement occurs when it
is suspected or assumed that an individual did commit past harmful
or dangerous acts not susceptible to easy proof. The resulting con-
finement is preventive in the sense that it aims primarily to preclude
repetition of the suspected conduct. The prediction or assumption that
the offender will repeat the act if not confined, however, rests on the
assumption that he actually committed the past act. The roots of this
approach run deep in Anglo-American legal history. Blackstone
characterized the peace bond, the preventive technique most frequently
employed at common law, as "preventive justice."39  This bond em-
powered the justices of the peace to require securities of those per-
sons who may be "inclined to the Breach of the Peace."4  Failure to
provide securities resulted in confinement in a gaol. Though preven-
tive in theory, the justices employed the bond largely against persons
suspected of past crimes, either as a result of their reputation ("of evil
Name and Fame") or their occupation (those "who live idly, and
38. See Dershowitz, When in Doubt, Don't Let Them Out, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,
1971, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
Sometimes a court may order this confinement because it suspects that the witness
was culpably involved in the crime. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno,
339 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965). Confinement under
these circumstances does not constitute pure preventive detention; confinement based
solely on a prediction of flight, however, fits comfortably within that category.
39. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *251.
40. M. DALTON, THE CouNmY JusTicE 380 (1727). For a detailed discussion of
the preventive jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, especially of their power to re-
quire peace bond sureties, see Dershowitz, The Origin and Practice of Preventive Con-
finement in Anglo-American History (Robert Marx Lectures at the University of Cin-
cinnati 1973-to be published in the University of Cincinnati Law Review in 1974).
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yet fare well, or are well apparelled, having nothing whereon to
live") .41
The law of vagrancy, especially as it is used in urban areas, has
carried this approach directly into modem times. Like the ancient
peace bond, its design permits its use both to prevent anticipated crime
and to punish suspected but unproven past crimes. The Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit has described the basic design of the
vagrancy law as "preventive conviction." "Vagrancy enforcement,"
said the court, is "a device utilized not only to inflict punishment for
suspected but unprovable violations in progress but also, through pre-
ventive conviction and incarceration, to suppress crime in the future
't puts people in jail who might be about to commit a crime
or who might commit a crime in the near future . . ' "42
Since this type of preventive confinement authorizes imprison-
ment on suspicion of an unproven or unprovable past offense, it
carries the inherent possibility of abuse. Hanrick v. State,43 a recent
sex psychopath case, well illustrates this possibility. A grand jury
indicted John Hamrick on two charges of rape against different
women. Hamrick claimed that the prosecuting witnesses consented.
At his trial on the first charge a jury unanimously acquitted him.
On the day set for trial of the second charge, the district attorney
called off the prosecution and petitioned the court to commit
Hamrick as a "criminal sexual psychopath." In support of his pet-
ition the district attorney submitted only "a transcript of the testimony
of the complaining witnesses in each of the preliminary hearings on
the rape charges." The Alabama Supreme Court found this evidence
sufficient to support Hamrick's commitment and went on to say that
even if "appellant was not guilty of rape because each of the prosecut-
ing witnesses consented to the sexual intercourse, there is still enough
evidence of indignities and acts of perversion by appellant to justify
the charge that he is a criminal sexual psychopathic person." 44  By
invoking the label of "prevention," the state succeeded in circumvent-
ing the requirement that it prove a specific crime to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Under the preventive statute the judge had only to
"ascertain" that Hamrick was a sex psychopath.4 5  Furthermore, the
41. M. DALTON, supra note 40, at 411.
42. Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
43. 281 Ala. 150, 199 So. 2d 849, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 10 (1967).
44. Id. at 152, 199 So. 2d at 850.
45. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 438 (1958).
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judge could reach this conclusion on the basis of psychiatric testimony,
which itself assumed unproven, noncriminal acts. The Supreme Court
dismissed Hamrick's appeal.48
This potential for abuse is not limited to the preventive detention
of sexual psychopaths, as Dodd v. Hughes,47 a Nevada Supreme Court
decision, illustrates. A Nevada district court had adjudged Monte Dean
Dodd a "mentally ill person" and committed him to the Nevada State
Hospital. Dodd sought release, and at his habeas corpus hearing the
hospital's superintendent testified that Dodd was not mentally ill within
the meaning of the state commitment law because he was not psychotic.
A second psychiatrist disagreed with the superintendent's definition
of mental illness, asserting that, while Dodd was indeed not psychotic,
he was a "sociopathic personality" and for that reason was statutorily
mentally ill. The trial judge resolved the psychiatrists' dispute over
the statutory meaning of mental illness by ordering Dodd committed
indefinitely, but to the state prison rather than to a mental hospital.
The state supreme court affirmed Dodd's commitment. It con-
curred in the trial court's judgment that the legislature used the term
"mental illness" to signify a broader category of disturbed individuals
than the psychiatric definition of psychosis encompassed and found
sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision
that Dodd was a menace to the public safety. As is often the case,
however, the appellate opinion failed to examine the real basis of con-
finement In fact, at trial it was assumed that Dodd had commit-
ted a serious assault three years before the hearing. It was believed
that Dodd had attacked an old farmer with a crowbar, saturated him
with gasoline, and set him ablaze.48  On the basis of this assumption
the psychiatrists had predicted Dodd's dangerous propensities, differ-
ing only in the confidence with which they asserted that he would en-
gage in harmful conduct and the quality of the harmful conduct that
they believed he would manifest.49 On the same basis the trial judge
46. Hamrick v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 10 (1967).
47. 81 Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540 (1965).
48. Dodd's counsel initially admitted this. Record at 2, Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev.
43, 398 P.2d 540 (1965). The trial judge stated: "[W]e have to assume, don't we,
that he did make the attack on the old man, hit him on the head with a crowbar,
saturated him with gasoline"--to which Dodd's counsel did not object. Record at
19.
49. Dr. Hughes, Superintendent of the Nevada State Hospital, testified that Dodd,
while relatively dangerous, was perhaps more dangerous to property than to people,
and was "certainly [not] a boy that is waiting to commit murder at the first oppor-
tunity, because he has had many opportunities." Record at 18-19. Dr. Coopersmith,
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concluded that Dodd was "a homicidal maniac," "an animal in hu-
man clothing," and a person who "was just born without a lot of neces-
sary wiring,"' 0 and ordered him incarcerated to protect society.
Although the record contained some evidence that Dodd had com-
mitted the crime in question 51 -one psychiatrist testified that Dodd
had admitted the act-his guilt had nonetheless never been proven.5 2
In order to ensure confinement for life, the state had apparently elected
to commit Dodd to the mental hospital rather than convict him of
the crime. As the trial judge explained: "You see we can't prosecute
this fellow. The antiquated, archaic criminal law doesn't take care of
his case."53  The hospital superintendent was equally candid: "There
was a choice about prosecuting it when this thing happened, and Judge
Wines told me he figured if he went to the state penitentiary he would
be out in a year or two. And if he went to the state hospital he would
be in forever. '54  The Dodd case thus provides a paradigm of preven-
tive confinement formally requiring no prior act, but based on sus-
pected criminal conduct that for one reason or another cannot be proved
or cannot be punished severely enough to satisfy all the state's goals.
The McCarran Detention Act,55 which was on the statute books
for about twenty years, provides yet another example of a confine-
ment mechanism that purported to be preventive, but that was in real-
ity based in large part on suspicion of past illegal acts that would have
on the other hand, testified that Dodd had "a higher potential for homicidal activities
than the average person" and should not be turned loose in society without a great
deal of supervision. Record at 13-14. (Having "a higher potential for homicidal activi-
ties than the average person" may still mean that he has considerably less than a
1 in 1000 chance of engaging in such activities.)
50. Record at 24.
51. Record at 19. Dodd, however, was never called to testify and in fact was
not present at the hearing. Record at 1.
52. Record at 19. Nor was Dodd's relationship to the other two boys who had
allegedly been involved in the assault ever clearly established. Record at 18-19.
53. Record at 27. The record did not clearly reflect why the state could no longer
prosecute Dodd for the alleged offense. Dr. Hughes' testimony suggests, however,
that the state may have allowed the juvenile court to process him after the offense oc-
curred:
When he was committed in the first place, he was handled as a juvenile,
and they picked their course and they took him and were going to do the best
they could for him.
... . Well, it turned out he wasn't curable. So then he came back and the
question was: What will we do next? They had already given up the chance
to take him through as an adult. So then they said, "Well, we'll commit him
as a mentally ill person."
Record at 28.
54. Record at 27-28.
55. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 1-116, 64 Stat. 1019 (repealed
1971).
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been difficult to prove at a criminal trial. The statute authorized the
preventive confinement-during periods of internal security emer-
gency--of persons who there was "reasonable ground to believe
. . . probably will commit or conspire with others to commit es-
pionage or sabotage . ,. The statute catalogued "evidentiary
matters" that should be considered in making this decision. Not sur-
prisingly, the matters consisted primarily of suspected past actions, such
as (1) whether "such person has knowledge of or has received or given
instruction or assignment in the espionage, counterespionage, or sab-
otage service"; (2) "any past . . . acts of espionage or sabotage"; or
(3) "activity in the espionage or sabotage operations of, or the
holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the
Communist Party of the United States. . . -.1 Acts within the first
category would, of course, constitute serious crimes if they could be
proved. The McCarran Act thus employed "preventive" detention in
this category of cases to dispense with the rigorous requirements of
proving past criminality. Acts in the second category would also be
crimes, unless they had already been punished or the statute of limita-
tions had run. "Preventive detention" was thus being employed to
circumvent the double jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions of the
Constitution. Acts in the third category, if not covered by the first
two, would consist of membership in an organization that a statute
of doubtful constitutionality had made criminal. The Act thus used
preventive detention to avoid a possible judicial decision that member-
ship could not be criminalized.
The McCarran Detention Act differed-in fundamental re-
spects-from the preventive action taken against the Japanese-Ameri-
cans. The former attempted primarily to confine individuals whose
past suspected acts of espionage, sabotage, or membership in hostile
organizations made them dangerous; the latter attempted to confine
an entire group without regard to individual past acts. Inclusion in the
former category required a voluntary act; inclusion in the latter re-
quired merely an involuntary and unchangeable "birth status."
Emergency preventive detention during times of war or internal
security danger-or administrative detention, as it is sometimes called-
is almost always a mechanism for confining "dangerous" persons who
are suspected of activities that cannot be proved at a criminal trial."
56. Id. § 109(h).
57. Id. § 109(h)(1)-(h)(3).
58. Administrative detention in Israel, for example, serves precisely that purpose.
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For example, the Irish, Canadian, and Israeli laws, as well as other
preventive measures, use this method to confine suspects. Some such
measures require a finding based on past acts, which need not satisfy
the usual criminal standards; others require, in form at least, a mere
prediction or determination of dangerousness without mentioning past
acts,"e though suspected past acts will often form the realistic basis for
the confinement.
The pretrial preventive detention statute that Congress recently
enacted-and the long standing practices that it legitimated-is an-
other example of preventive confinement formally requiring no con-
viction for a past crime, but resting heavily on the assumption that a
past crime was committed. The principle problem addressed by this
device is not lack of evidence, but lack of time. Many detainees are
actually guilty of the crimes for which they stand charged, or so the
judges and prosecutors certainly believe. Nonetheless, there will be an
inevitable hiatus between the time of arrest and the time when the past
crime can be proved. To prevent further crime, the act authorizes
the judge to confine those defendants he believes may be especially
dangerous, if otherwise they would be permitted to remain at liberty
during the hiatus. That decision, however, is supposed to rest in large
part on the strength of the evidence that he committed past crimes,
including the one for which he stands charged.60
C. Duration of Confinement
At the point of the preventive continuum closest to the conven-
tional criminal law lie the confinement mechanisms that require either
proof or conviction of a specific criminal act as a trigger for confine-
ment, the duration of which depends on the actor's predicted danger-
For a thorough discussion of one case that puts the problem there in sharp focus,
as well as a discussion of the alternatives, see Dershowitz, Terrorism and Preventive
Detention: The Case of Israel, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1970, at 67. See also Dershowitz,
Stretch Points of Liberty: Would the Constitution Be Suspended During Times of Crisis,
212 Thna NATON 329 (1971).
59. Nevertheless, most administratively detained individuals are suspected of some
past illegal act. The mechanism has another possibility of abuse, however; using it,
authorities may confine individuals solely to silence protected, but dangerous, speech.
See Dershowitz, Terrorism and Preventive Detention, supra note 58.
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (Supp. V 1972). For former Attorney General
Mitchell's defense of this statute see Hearings on Anti-Crime Proposals Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (Supp. 1970); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention,
55 VA. L. RaV. 1223 (1969). For a criticism of the statute see Dershowitz, Imprison-
ment By Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A.J. 560 (1971).
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ousness rather than on the past act alone. The debate between Chief
Justice Burger and Chief Judge Bazelon in the Cross case focused on
this mechanism. In that case past acts of exhibitionism had triggered
the appellant's confinement."' Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out that
indecent exposure normally carried a maximum sentence of ninety
days, while the statute in question would subject the appellant to con-
finement for the rest of his life.
These kinds of preventive statutes are prevalent throughout the
United States. The Maryland defective delinquency statute, which
has been the subject of much recent litigation, 2 is but one example. It
provides for indefinite confinement of up to life for allegedly danger-
ous defendants convicted of even minor offenses. Statutes that pro-
vide for automatic and indeterminate commitment of persons acquitted
by reason of insanity without regard to the crime of which they were
"acquitted" are another. Additionally, many sentencing and parole
decisions belong in this category. In these situations the legislature
and presumably the Constitution has authorized a broad range of per-
missible sentences in response to a past crime. The decision concern-
ing the appropriate duration of confinement within that range is often
made largely on the basis of a prediction concerning the likelihood that
the convicted criminal will recidivate. It may, of course, be argued
that these decisions involve no element of preventive confinement, since
the statute authorizes the maximum sentence and the decision to im-
pose less is not really a decision to confine on a prediction of danger-
ousness, but a decision to release on a prediction of nondangerousness.
Yet under any characterization the length of the convicted criminal's
confinement turns at least in part on a prediction of his propensity to
commit future crimes.
Indeterminate sentencing laws have carried this approach to its
logical extreme. These laws use the commission of criminal acts of a
certain degree of severity or frequency to trigger an indeterminate
sentence of up to life, and leave the decision when, and whether,
to release to the discretion of some administrative board.63
61. Cross had pleaded guilty to one count of exhibitionism. Chief Justice (then
Judge) Burger argued that "Appellant's record stipulation that he recently engaged
in various acts of indecent exposure supplies the basis for commitment . . . ." 418
F.2d at 1109.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, §§ 1-19 (Supp. 1972); see, e.g., Sas v. Maryland,
295 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969), affd sub nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 999 (1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
407 U.S. 355 (1972).
63. See FRANKEL, supra note 22.
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These examples define some points along the preventive confine-
ment continuum. There are obvious differences of policy and consti-
tutionality between the decision to confine a racial group on the basis
of vague predictions tied to no past acts and the decision to sentence a
convicted exhibitionist to life because of a prediction based on his past
conduct. Yet there are similarities as well, and when courts confront
the issues of preventive confinement, they should be sensitive to both
the differences and the similarities. Moreover, they should abjure re-
liance on labels such as "preventive detention" as a substitute for care-
ful analysis. And courts will confront these difficult issues in the
coming years. In his recent opinion in Jackson v. Indiana,64 Justice
Blackmun discussed the "bases" for various confinement mechanisms,
such as civil commitment, defective delinquency laws, sexual psycho-
path laws, and commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity.
"Considering the number of persons affected," he observed, "it is per-
haps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this
power have not been more frequently litigated."6 5  Organizations in-
terested in challenging these laws have not ignored this unambiguous
invitation to litigate.
Several courts recently have considered constitutional challenges
to various forms of preventive confinement, but few substantive limita-
tions have emerged. Courts have taken a number of approaches that
have permitted them to avoid the substantive constitutional issues. Not
surprisingly, most have focused on procedural safeguards or their ab-
sence in predictive determinations. As Justice Harlan said in his sep-
arate opinion in the Gault case, while courts "must give the widest
deference to legislative judgments" concerning the substantive criteria
for confinement, "courts have been understood to possess particular
competence" in assessing the "necessity and wisdom of procedural
guarantees." 66  For generations, however, courts avoided even the
responsibility of supervising the procedures associated with predictive
determinations. This evasion took the form of a legal labeling game
known as "civil v. criminal."
11. Legal Labels: Civil v. Criminal
The object of the civil-criminal labeling game is simple: the
court must determine whether certain procedural safeguards, required
64. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
65. Id. at 737.
66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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by the Constitution in "all criminal prosecutions," apply to various pro-
ceedings. The rules are a bit more complex. The legislature enacts
a statute that restricts the liberty of one player-variously called the
defendant, patient, juvenile ward, deportee, et cetera. That player
must then convince the court that the formal proceeding through which
the state restricts his liberty is really a criminal prosecution. The state,
on the other hand, must show that the proceeding is really civil; for
support it often claims that the results of the proceeding help, rather
than hurt, its opponent.
In the course of this game's long history, prosecutors have suc-
ceeded with the help of the court, and all too often, without the oppo-
sition of "defense" attorneys, in attaching the civil label to a wide range
of proceedings including commitment of juveniles, sex psychopaths,
the mentally ill, alcoholics, drug addicts, and security risks. Likewise,
sterilization, deportation, and revocation of parole and probation pro-
ceedings are regarded as civil. By attaching this label, the state has
successfully denied defendants almost every important safeguard re-
quired in criminal trials. Invocation of this talismanic word has erased
a veritable bill of rights. As Alice said, "That's a great deal to make
one word [do]." To which Humpty Dumpty responded: "When I
make a word do a lot of work like that. . . I always pay it extra. 67
Until quite recently, this word must have been well paid indeed, for
it was doing the work of an army of jurists.
A. "Civil"
As with most traditional games, a number of favorite gambits
have developed over the years. Some courts, for example, give no rea-
son at all for concluding that a proceeding is civil. They simply as-
sert, often in italics, that it is clearly, demonstrably, or manifestly civil.
Others have attributed conclusive significance to the chapter of the
code in which the proceeding appears. Thus, one state supreme court
said that a sex psychopath proceeding was obviously not criminal be-
cause it was not located "in either the Code of Criminal Procedure or
the Penal Code."6 8 Location in the statute books, however, is not al-
ways dispositive. The United States Supreme Court held that a Cali-
fornia statute that made narcotics addiction a misdemeanor was crim-
67. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 95 (1965).
68. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 602, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942).
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inal though contained in the "Health and Safety Code."0  The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court then held an addict commitment law civil though
it appeared in the penal code.70
In accord with Supreme Court dicta that evidence of a legislative
intent to regulate rather than punish might justify the absence of crim-
inal safeguards, 71 courts sometimes look to the declared legislative pur-
pose to decide whether a proceeding is civil or criminal. Thus, one
state supreme court attributed significance to a statutory declaration
that "the Director of the Department of Corrections shall engage in a
program of research in the detention, treatment and rehabilitation of
narcotic addicts. '72  That court omitted to mention that similar horta-
tory statements decorate the pages of many penal codes.7 3  Some courts
have gone as far as attributing significance to the title borne by the
judicial document that commences the proceeding. As the California
Supreme Court once observed: "The certificate [filed in this addict
commitment case] is entitled 'The People of the State of California
69. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
70. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied,
374 U.S. 856 (1963).
71. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 & n.43 (1963).
72. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 146-47, 378 P.2d 793, 805, 28 Cal. Rptr.
489, 501 (1963). The California court relied on this and five other provisions of
the statute, Cal. Penal Code § 6405, ch. 850, [19611 Cal. Stat. 2224 (now CAL.
WELF. & IIST'NS CODE § 3005 (West 1972)), in upholding its constitutionality.
73. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81 (Supp. 1973) ('The commissioner of
correction shall ... be responsible for establishing disciplinary, diagnostic, classifica-
tion, treatment, vocational and academic education, research and statistics, training
and development services . . ... "); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-2-2(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1973) ("the Department shall have the . . . [powers] ... [tlo develop and
maintain programs of control, rehabilitation and employment of committed persons
within its institutions."); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 241.27(1) (1972) (The commissioner
of correction is empowered to provide "more adequate, regular and suitable employ-
ment for the vocational training and rehabilitation of inmates . . . ."). In particular,
Massachusetts law provides that the commissioner of correction shall "establish, main-
tain and administer programs of rehabilitation, including but not limited to education,
training and employment, of persons committed to the custody of the department
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 124, § 1(e) (Supp. 1972). Moreover, prisoners
are to be classified "to promote their reformation," id. ch. 127, § 21 (1958), and
are to be treated "with the kindness which their obedience, industry and good conduct
merit." Id. § 32. Perhaps in Massachusetts even criminal prosecutions are civil.
If declarations of purpose were truly dispositive, even the death penalty might
be regulatory, as Holmes's famous letter, which could easily become a declaration of
legislative policy, shows:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged
I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to
make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common
good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country ....
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski, Dec. 17, 1925, in 1 HoLmEs-LAsKi
LETTERS 806 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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For the Best Interest and Protection of Society and [the person to be
committed]' rather than 'The People v. the accused.' "4
Another technique for establishing that a proceeding is civil is to
compare it with some other proceeding that is "clearly" civil. For
example, one court recently held a sex psychopath law civil because
"it resemble[d]" a commitment proceeding, which is certainly civil.7 5 An-
other court held a commitment proceeding to be civil because it had much
in common with a sex psychopath law, which courts have repeatedly
"held .. . to be civil."' 76  There is hardly a proceeding that has not
been deemed civil because of its similarity to another proceeding that
had in turn been deemed civil because of its similarity to the proceeding
at issue.
Another approach that courts sometimes use to justify their con-
clusion that a particular proceeding is civil suffers from as much circu-
larity as these comparisons, but is far more dangerous. Courts some-
times reason that whether a proceeding is criminal or civil depends on
74. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 140, 378 P.2d 793, 805, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489,
501 (1963) (emphasis in original). The California Supreme Court, however, has since
abandoned this ground. See, e.g., People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 284, 398 P.2d 391,
395, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1965).
To preserve this fictional role, some prosecutors even object to the use of words
"prosecutor" and "accused" at trial. In a recent commitment proceeding, concerning
a sociopath who had been charged with carrying a concealed weapon, the patient's
attorney inadvertently referred to the government attorney as the prosecutor. The
government attorney rose, in righteous indignation, to "object to that classification.
I am not a prosecutor in this case and this person is not an accused." His objection,
made in the best prosecutorial style, was of course sustained. Unreported hearing
before the District of Columbia District Court, excerpted in KATZ, GouSMIN & DERSHO-
wrrz, supra note 32, at 603-10.
75. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 603, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942), interpreting
Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act, No. 165, [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts 323 (re-
pealed 1968). A number of other states utilize similar logic in construing their sexual
psychopath statutes. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa
1969) (procedure and purpose of the law are civil, similar to those in mental illness
determinations); State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950)
(act resembles statutes providing for civil inquiry into sanity); In re Craft, 99 N.H.
287, 109 A.2d 853 (1954) (statutory procedure analogous to insanity proceeding).
Contra, Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965), enforcing Millard v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (harmonization of sexual psychopath law with civil
commitment of mentally ill is impossible); Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215,
233 P.2d 159 (1951) (commitment of sexual psychopath not equivalent to pronounce-
ment of insanity, and no analogies should be drawn between sexual psychopath and
insanity statutes).
76. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
It should be noted that a third possible permutation of this technique exists: de-
claring a new sexual psychopath statute civil by comparison with such a statute of
another jurisdiction that has previously designated it civil. Nebraska has employed
this device. See State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583 (1965).
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the procedural safeguards that accompany it. If it has the safeguards
usually associated with a criminal proceeding, then it is criminal; if it
lacks those safeguards, then it must be civil. Thus, in determining that
a statute could "only be viewed as civil in nature, purpose and effect,"
one court looked to the commitment procedures at issue to find they did
"not involve trial by jury as in criminal cases."' 77 The dangers of
this approach are patent: it may actually encourage a state to eliminate
important safeguards in order to assure that courts will regard the pro-
ceeding as civil. An episode from the history of Michigan's sex psy-
chopath law demonstrates this danger.
In 1937, the Michigan legislature enacted a relatively narrow sex
psychopath law that applied only to persons convicted of, or serving
sentences for, specified sex offenses. The law required a jury trial and
other procedural safeguards."8 In 1938, a man who had been con-
victed of one of these specified sex offenses challenged the statute.79
After he had served three months of his five-year sentence, a jury
found that he was committable under the sex psychopath law. He
challenged the constitutionality of the law, alleging that the proceeding,
though criminal in nature, failed to provide all the safeguards re-
quired in criminal proceedings. The attorney general contended that
it was "a civil proceeding and analogous to statutory inquests relative
to insane prisoners, which [are] civil in nature." 80 The court agreed with
the petitioner. Although it conceded that an insanity inquest consti-
tuted a civil proceeding, it rejected the attorney general's analogy.
An insane person, the court reasoned, may be committed without proof
of any criminal act, whereas "under this act defendant is under sen-
tence for an overt sex deviation offense." 81  Furthermore, the court
said, "we must class [the law] where we find it placed by its authors,
and we find it in the . . .criminal code ... *"82 It concluded
that as a criminal statute it was unconstitutional because it subjected
"an accused to two trials and convictions in different courts for a single
statutory crime."' 83 Thus, in declaring the law unconstitutional, the
court focused on two of the act's most important safeguards-the re-
77. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 145-46, 378 P.2d 793, 804, 28 Cal. Rptr.
489, 500 (1963).
78. No. 196, ch. IX, §§ 1-a, -b, [1937] Mich. Pub. Acts 306 (repealed 1939).
79. People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
80. Id. at 59, 281 N.W. at 536.
81. Id. at 59, 281 N.W. at 537.
82. Id. at 58-59, 281 N.W. at 536.
83. Id. at 58, 281 N.W. at 536.
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quirement of a specified sex offense conviction and the availability of
jury trials on the issues of conviction and committability. The mes-
sage to the legislature was clear: a constitutional sex psychopath law
must eliminate the requirement of a conviction, do away with the right
of two jury trials, and be published in the proper section of the code.
The following year the Michigan legislature did precisely that. It
enacted a new law, which covered persons "charged with" any "crim-
inal offense," and placed it in a different part of the code. It permit-
ted only one jury trial, on the issue of committability, which the defen-
dant had to request affirmatively. The legislature made numerous oth-
er changes as well, most of which made commitment easier and release
more difficult.8 4 A man who had been charged with "an act of
gross indecency" soon challenged his commitment under the new sta-
tute.8 5 This time, however, the court was
satisfied that the present statute . . . contains none of the
constitutional infirmities of the previous statute . . . . The
present statute is not contained in either the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure or the Penal Code. It makes sex deviators
subject to restraint because of their acts and condition, and
not because of conviction and sentence for a criminal of-
fense. The procedure under this statute resembles a sta-
tutory inquest for the commitment of an insane person
"!86
Accordingly, the court held that the statute was civil and that the con-
stitutional safeguards claimed by petitioner-protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, self-incrimination, and ex post facto laws-
did not apply. 7  The defendant based his arguments, the court said,
"on the erroneous assumption that the statute is a criminal statute and
that the period of confinement is punitive." 's Satisfied by its own
well rounded arguments, the court affirmed the order of commitment.
The state had learned well the lesson of the first decision: the
best way to assure that courts will uphold a criminal statute against a
charge that it fails to provide every safeguard is to eliminate enough of
84. No. 165, [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts 323 (repealed 1968). The repealing stat-
ute, Micr. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 330.35b (Supp. 1973), allows parole of any person
committed under the old act.
85. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
86. Id. at 602, 4 N.W.2d at 26.
87. Id. at 601, 604, 608, 4 N.W.2d at 25, 27, 28. The court also held that the
new statute satisfied federal due process and equal protection requirements. Id. at
599, 603, 4 N.W.2d at 25, 26.
88. Id. at 600, 4 N.W.2d at 25.
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the existing safeguards so that the statute will be deemed civil and
thus "not circumscribed by the constitutional and statutory limitations
surrounding a person accused of. . . a crime.""9 This labeling game
left Michigan with a "constitutional" statute that provided far fewer
safeguards and far harsher consequences than its previous "unconstitu-
tional" statute.
B. Nonadversary
Since even civil proceedings require certain fundamental safeguards
that some prosecutors prefer to circumvent, a variation of the first
labeling game has been devised. Judges have sometimes said that cer-
tain proceedings were neither criminal nor civil. Mr. Justice Stewart
recently expressed this view about juvenile delinquency proceedings.
"[They] are not criminal trials," he said. "They are not civil trials.
They are simply not adversary proceedings." 90  The possible implica-
tions of this position become clearer against the background of the
dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona,91 which Justice Stewart
joined. The dissenters first wondered about the therapeutic effects of
confession, arguing that confession may benefit the accused by provid-
ing psychological relief and enhancing his prospects for rehabilitation.
That confession may also result in imprisonment seemed not to dimin-
ish its potential beneficial effect, for the dissenters then asked:
Is it so clear that release is the best thing for him in every
case? Has it so unquestionably been resolved that in each
and every case it would be better for him not to confess and
to return to his environment with no attempt whatsoever to
help him? I think not. It may well be that in many cases
it will be no less than a callous disregard for his own wel-
fare .... 92
Now, if imprisonment is really sometimes the "best thing," then per-
haps even a criminal trial culminating in imprisonment should not al-
ways be regarded as an adversary proceeding. Chief Justice (then
89. Id. at 603, 4 N.W.2d at 26.
90. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also In
re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 244, 85 A.2d 371, 375 (1952) ("mhe nature of the proceed-
ing is not criminal nor really even an adversary civil proceeding in the ordinary
sense."); In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 373, 77 A.2d 26, 28 (1950) (The purpose
of the New Hampshire Sexual Psychopath Law, ch. 314, [1949] N.H. Laws 422 now
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-A (1972), was to protect society and to "benefit the
person involved.").
91. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
92. Id. at 543.
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Judge) Burger came close to this position in considering a parole revo-
cation proceeding that culminated in incarceration. He noted that
"[t]he Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Board operate from the basic
premise that prisoners placed in their custody are to be rehabilitated and
restored to useful lives as soon as in the Board's judgment that transi-
tion can be safely made." From that he concluded that parole revoca-
tion is not an "adversary proceeding in the usual sense" because there
is a "genuine identity of interest if not purpose" between the parolee
and the Board. "Here we do not have pursuer and quarry but a rela-
tionship partaking of parens patriae."' 3
C. The Decline of the Civil Label
Courts have begun in recent years to resist "the feeble enticement
of the 'civil' label-of-convenience,"94 and to question the "murky"
meaning and "dubious" credentials of the "parens patriae" notionY5
In Gault the Supreme Court held various provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to certain juvenile delinquency proceedings. "[C]om-
mitment," the Court said, "is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarcera-
tion against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' "96 The
Court also rejected the state's argument that juvenile proceedings "were
not adversary [since] the state was proceeding as parens patriae. '97
It recognized that under this Latin banner "the powers of the Star
Chamber [had become but] a trifle in comparison with those of our
juvenile courts .... "98s It concluded that the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court.
The Court invoked similar rhetoric in deciding that commitment
93. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963). Judge Burger did not elaborate on the "identity of interest" between the
parole officer who is seeking to return the parolee to prison, and the parolee who
is seeking to remain free and denying violation. But presumably that "identity of
interest" is the greater good of the parolee, which can only be attained by denying
him the privilege he has abused. "In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole
occupies the role of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as punish-
ment but for misuse of the privilege." Id. at 237. "The procedures for terminating
parole are simply an acknowledgment that in granting parole some errors will be made
and the errant parolee must be retaken for his own good as well as that of society."
Id. at 242.
94. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 50.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 18, quoting Pound, Foreward to P. YOUNG, SociAL TREATmENT IN PRO-
BATION AND DELINQUENCY (1937).
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proceedings under the Colorado Sex Offender Act,99 whether denom-
inated civil or criminal are subject to both the equal protection and
due process clause.100 The Court held that when violation of one
criminal statute is made the basis for commencing another proceed-
ing, the incarceration under the second proceeding "is criminal punish-
ment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as to keep
individuals from inflicting future harm.' '10 1
HI. Emerging Legal Labels: Predictive v. Retrospective
As the civil label of convenience thus began its decline into jud-
icial disrepute, a similar labeling game began its ascent. This game
distinguishes between proceedings that determine whether specific past
acts occurred and proceedings that predict future behavior. No less
a liberal than Judge David Bazelon has suggested that predictive judg-
ments require fewer safeguards than determinations of past acts.'02
The Supreme Court, too, authoritatively articulated this position in
Williams v. New York." 3 It contrasted the determination of guilt
with the judge's predictive decision about the type and extent of punish-
ment. The determination of past conduct, said the Court, requires
evidentiary rules that "narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence
that is strictly relevant to the particular offense charged" whereas the
predictive decision requires "the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics."' 0 4  Thus "open court testi-
mony with cross-examination" would be "totally impractical, if not
impossible."0 5 The Court concluded, therefore, that due process per-
mitted a sentencing judge to impose the death penalty instead of the
jury's recommended prison sentence because of information obtained
ex parte through closed sources, like the probation department.
The Court also suggested this distinction in two later decisions that
rejected the civil-criminal dichotomy. In Gault the Court carefully
limited its holding to "proceedings by which a determination is made as
99. Act of April 1, 1953, ch. 89, 1953 Sess. Laws of Colo., 1st Reg. Sess. 249-
52, as amended Act of April 23, 1957, ch. 122, 1957 Sess. Laws of Colo., 1st Reg.
Sess. 329-32, Act of Feb. 11, 1963, ch. 96, 1963 Sess. Laws of Colo., 1st Reg. Sess.
282 (repealed 1968).
100. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
101. Id. at 608-9.
102. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 252 (D.C. Cir.) (alternative holding), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); see Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
But see Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
103. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
104. Id. at 247.
105. Id. at 250.
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to whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct
on his part .... ,'*o It reiterated this limitation throughout its opin-
ion and has reaffirmed it in subsequent opinions.11 7  In Specht v.
Patterson0 5 the Court explicitly distinguished the Colorado Sex Of-
fender Act from the statute that it had upheld years earlier in Minne-
sota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,"°9 which it thought "was not crim-
inal in nature, and was not triggered by a criminal conviction." 110
Other than in their procedural safeguards, the two statutes differed sig-
nificantly only in that the Minnesota statute could apply to a person
who was not convicted of, or even charged with, a crime, while the
Colorado statute required a criminal conviction. Reminiscent of the
Michigan experience, this line of reasoning suggests that certain pro-
cedural safeguards are required only in proceedings where a specific
past act must be proved. If the legislature chooses to commit defend-
ants on the basis of predictive determinations that require no proof of
a specific act, then it need provide fewer procedural safeguards.
Only Justice Harlan explicitly recognized the dangers of this new-
est labeling game. In his separate Gault opinion he argued that the
Court had done both too much and too little. It had required too
many safeguards in proceedings to punish past delinquency and too
few in proceedings to prevent predicted harm. He reminded the Court
that between 26 and 48 percent of the children brought before juvenile
courts are not charged with past crimes and cautioned that "it would
be imprudent, at the least, to build upon these classifications rigid sys-
tems of procedural requirements which would be applicable, or not,
in accordance with the descriptive label given to the particular pro-
ceeding." A better approach, he suggested, would require the essen-
tial elements of fundamental fairness in juvenile courts, however the
state labeled the proceeding. This approach would avoid both unnec-
essarily rigid restrictions and dependence on illusory classifications."'
106. 387 U.S. at 13.
107. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971). Justice Blackmun
there characterized six Supreme Court decisions concerning juvenile delinquency as re-
quiring certain constitutional safeguards during "that part of the state juvenile proceed-
ing that is adjudicative in nature." Justice Blackmun apparently meant adjudicative
of past acts. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 368 (1970) ("[P]roof
beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment'
required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.").
108. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
109. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
110. 386 U.S. at 610 n.3.
111. 387 U.S. at 77.
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Even Justice Harlan, however, ultimately seemed to assume that
noncriminal predictive judgments require fewer safeguards than deter-
minations of past criminal acts. In explaining his preference for
"fundamental fairness" regardless of label, he offered this familiar ob-
servation:
Efforts are now being made to develop effective, and en-
tirely noncriminal, methods of treatment for these children.
In such cases, the state authorities are in the most literal
sense acting in loco parentis; they are, by any standard,
concerned with the child's protection, and not with his pun-
ishment. I do not question that the methods employed
in such cases must be consistent with the constitutional obli-
gation to act in accordance with due process, but certainly
the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand that they be
constricted by the procedural guarantees devised for ordinary
criminal prosecutions. 112
Thus Justice Harlan's own set of labels eventually captivated him.
Aware of their often "arbitrary" and "ambiguous" nature, he was un-
willing to see them frozen into constitutional rules. But in the final
analysis he too subscribed to the view that predictive judgments require
fewer safeguards than ordinary criminal prosecutions.
Despite the courts' assumptions, there is nothing about the nature
of predictive judgments that supports the view that they require fewer
safeguards than determinations of specific past acts. First, the conse-
quences of predictive judgments do not-as a general matter-restrict
freedom less than the consequences of historical determinations. The
time spent behind walls because of a predictive judgment may often ex-
ceed the period of confinement resulting from a conviction. Nor do
the conditions of confinement in a hospital differ significantly from
those in a prison. Even when they do differ significantly, conditions
in the hospital may sometimes restrict freedom even more than those in
the prison." 3  Moreover, the probability of error in predictive judg-
ments may well exceed the probability of an erroneous conviction,
and the reasons for this difference cut in favor of even greater formality
and control in the process of predicting the future than in the process of
determining the past. Participants in judicial decisionmaking have some
112. Id. at 76-77.
113. In two recent cases, for example, inmates of mental hospitals, one federal
and one state, petitioned for transfer to ordinary prisons, where they thought the re-
gime would be less punitive and more pleasant. Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970); United States ex rel. Shuster
v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
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sense of what it means to decide whether a specifically charged act
was committed. Even without formal rules of evidence, the partici-
pants would bring to the decisionmaking process some framework for
sorting out the relevant, believable, significant facts. This framework,
though often rough and untested, is far more than the judge or jury is
likely to bring to the process of predicting the future. While all judg-
ments about human events, whether past or future, rest upon a super-
structure of assumptions-a theory about how people behave-the
experience of participants in the judicial process better equips them to
construct and employ theories of the past than theories of the future.
We are all historians, but few of us are scientists. Perhaps Lewis
Carroll's Queen had a "memory" that worked equally well both ways:
she remembered "things that happened the week after next" even bet-
ter than things that happened yesterday. But Alice spoke for most of
us when she said that her memory "only works one way . . . . I can't
remember things before they happen.""' 4
Some courts have suggested that while determinations of past acts
are based on "facts," predictions are based on something other than
facts. Therefore, they argue, those safeguards designed for factual de-
terminations are not suited to predictions. If it is true, however, that
judges predict on the basis of unverified hunches and implicit preju-
dices, then even greater reason exists to require those safeguards that
force articulation of the grounds for decision. Predictive judgments,
if they are to have any possibility of systematic accuracy, must be based
on precisely the same sorts of historical facts on which past determina-
tions are based.
Nor is it more important, as some courts and commentators
have suggested, to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial information in ar-
riving at past determinations than in making future ones. Numerous
studies have demonstrated that a surplus of information distorts predic-
tions at least as much as it does past determinations. 115  A study, en-
titled "Does One Sometimes Know Too Much?,"" 0 supports this widely
114. L. CARROLL, supra note 67, at 73.
115. See Stelmachers & McHugh, Contribution of Stereotyped and Indivdualized In-
formation to Predictive Accuracy, 28 J. CONSULT. PSYCHOL. 234 (1965) (prediction
accuracy increases when predictors not allowed to use own discrimination to weigh
variables); Walker & Bourne, The Identification of Concepts as a Function of Amount
of Relevant and Irrelevant Information, 74 AM. J. PSYc HOL. 410 (1961).
116. Bartlett & Green, Clinical Prediction: Does One Sometimes Know Too
Much?, 13 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 267-70 (1966). In this study experimentors
asked 6 experienced psychologists to predict the grade score performance of 40
students. They first gave the psychologists only the students' high school rank and
1306
Texas Law Review
Preventive Confinement
accepted conclusion. The study demonstrated that, though psycholo-
gists predicted significantly more accurately with fewer items of data
available to them, they showed far more confidence in their predictions
made with greater amount of data. The study concluded that the in-
creased confidence was not only unjustified, but that it might be nega-
tively related to the validity of the predictions. Therefore, as the
experimentors observed, the study did not support "[t]he common notion
that the clinicians"-or in this instance "judges".-"can be expected to
exclude irrelevant information and utilize only the information that will
maximize [their] predictions . . . ."I" Thus the "requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence," which Williams v. New York
deemed inappropriate to sentencing, seems essential in predictive as
well as postdictive determinations.
Although identical safeguards need not apply to all predictive de-
terminations in precisely the same manner as they apply to past de-
terminations, the need for restrictive rules and procedural safeguards,
appropriately designed for each particular type of proceeding, does not
differ significantly. This approach can be illustrated by reference to
several types of predictive proceedings and specific safeguards.
A. Judicial Predictive Determinations
1. Predictions in Sentencing.-It has been widely assumed that
the aims of sentencing-particularly the preventive and rehabilitative
aims-are best served by vesting the trial judge with untrammeled dis-
cretion to consider whatever factors he deems appropriate. This un-
verified assumption, which lies at the core of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in the Williams case, was reiterated a few years ago by Judge
Campbell, a distinguished federal trial judge. In United States v.
Wiley" s the judge repeated the oft heard refrain: "Those factors
which motivate the trial judge. . . are, for the most part, difficult to
determine by a reviewing court because of their obvious subjective qual-
ities." :19  The judge did not explain what these factors are or why
judges must or should rely on them in reaching their sentencing deci-
their scores on 3 tests. They next gave the same information, plus 18 other
assumed relevant items, such as age, sex, marital status, major, hours of part time
work, father's education, reading speed and comprehension, and six other test scores.
In every case, the psychologists predicted significantly more accurately with fewer
items of data, though they were more confident of their predictions made with the
greater amount of data.
117. Id. at 270.
118. 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
119. Id. at 683.
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sions. Elsewhere in his writings, however, he provided a clue, assert-
ing that sentencing decisions rest on "the judge's own set of convictions
toward a special kind of offense; toward a certain economic or social
class; toward certain religious, or racial groups; toward a set of moral,
religious, or ethical principles which he may possess. 120
If by attitudes towards religious or racial groups, Judge Camp-
bell means that judges sentence on the basis of a belief that certain
religions or races are morally superior to others, then this personal value
preference seems clearly inappropriate. If, as seems more likely, he
means that judges sentence on the basis of a belief that certain religious
or racial groups are, statistically, more likely to recidivate, then this
"subjective" factor constitutes an assumption of fact that may or may
not be accurate and relevant. Both its relevancy and accuracy should be
open to question, not hidden under a veil of judicial discretion.
Judge Campbell himself relied on a series of "facts" when he im-
posed the sentence at issue in Wiley. He asserted, for example, that
Wiley, who apparently had no criminal record, "was involved in [an-
other] burglary" and that he "perjured himself when he testified that
he had helped to dispose of any other stolen merchandise."' 1  He also
asserted a different kind of fact: that defendants who plead guilty
"generally" are repentant and that the defendants who pleaded guilty
in this case, all of whom had criminal records, "did stand conscience-
stricken in repentance before the Court."'122 The judge relied on these
"facts" in arriving at his predictive conclusions that "Wiley . . . will
go back to his underworld friends without remorse and will continue to
infect and disease our society," whereas the other defendants "have
greater prospects of rehabilitation."
Certainly, Judge Campbell honestly assumed that these predictions,
based on twenty years of judicial experience, were correct. Twenty
years of experience, however, is often only one year of experience re-
peated twenty times. The unknown mistakes of the past become the
foundation for a confident, but erroneous, prediction of the future.
This was demonstrated many years ago in a famous "experiment!' con-
ducted by the Harvard psychologist Thomdike who had a student
throw darts repeatedly at a board to test the thesis that aim improves
with "experience." Thomdike blindfolded the student, however, and
120. Campbell, Developing Systematic Sentencing Procedures, 18 FED. PROB. 3, 6
(Sept. 1954).
121. 184 F. Supp. at 686.
122. Id. at 687.
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never told him when he hit or missed. Needless to say, the student's
aim did not improve with "experience." Nor does the accuracy of a
judge's predictions improve simply as a result of spending more and
more years meting out untested sentences. In this case, for example,
had Judge Campbell removed his judicial blindfold, he would have
learned that his predictions have apparently turned out wrong in every
respect. He predicted that Wiley would "go back to his underworld
friends without remorse and will continue to infect and disease our soc-
iety."' 3 A followup letter from the United States Bureau of Prisons,
however, states that "Wiley has evidently stayed out of trouble since
the decision .... ",124 Judge Campbell also predicted that the other
defendants "have greater prospects of rehabilitation than Wiley."'1 25
The same communication from the Bureau of Prisons, however, indi-
cates that each of the other defendants has been arrested on at least
one occasion since release from jail and that one has been arrested six
times and is now serving a sentence for burglary. It is likely that to
this day Judge Campbell does not know how wrong he was. He con-
tinues to throw his judicial darts without once pausing to lift the protec-
tive blindfold that insulates him from knowledge of his errors.
Since predictions are no more accurate than the "facts" upon which
they rest, nothing more could be expected of Judge Campbell's predic-
tion. In addition, since accurate prediction requires both correct his-
torical facts and a verified predictive theory, accurate factfinding alone
does not guarantee valid predictions. Nonetheless, correct facts are at
least one necessary element of reliable forecasting; so facts should not
be used unless the truthtesting safeguards of the adversary process
have verified their reliability. Consider, for example, Judge Campbell's
reliance on Wiley's alleged participation in an earlier burglary and his
perjury at the trial. The basis for these "facts" was a secret report
by unidentified "government investigators" that was not part of the rec-
ord of the case. If Wiley had been tried on the burglary and per-
jury charges, the Government would have had to establish the truth
of these historical facts. No court in any Anglo-American jurisdiction
would tolerate a judge's reliance on secret ex parte gossip to determine
guilt. Yet in this case, when the accuracy of the prediction depended
on the accuracy of the very same facts, the court had no embarrass-
ment about boasting of its reliance on such "evidence."
123. Id.
124. Letter to Alan Dershowitz from John P. Conrad, Chief of Research, Bureau
of Prisons, United States Department of Justice, Mar. 28, 1968.
125. 184 F. Supp. at 688.
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Despite its broad language, the Willams decision itself lends
little support to the type of judicial subjectivity in which Judge Camp-
bell indulged. On the contrary, the Williams Court carefully pointed
out that the defendant there had not challenged the accuracy of the
facts on which the trial judge relied in passing sentence. This nar-
rower reading of Williams only allows the trial judge discretion to con-
sider accurate information in making his subjective, predictive sentenc-
ing decision. "Townsend v. Burke,128 decided just one year prior to
Williams, supports this narrower view. In Townsend the trial judge re-
cited the defendant's alleged criminal record, which included a charge
of "receiving stolen goods, a saxophone." He then asked the defen-
dant: "What did you want with a saxophone? Didn't hope to play in
the prison band then did you?" Before the uncounseled defendant
could answer, the Judge said: "Ten to twenty in the Penitentiary."
As it happened, the defendant had never been convicted of the saxo-
phone charge, nor of two other charges that his record reflected. This
egregious error, the Court held, and the absence of counsel to correct
it, combined to deprive the defendant of due process. 12 7
In this fashion the Supreme Court has given guidance at the polar
terminals of sentencing discretion. The sentencing judge may rely on
concededly true material facts regardless of their source and without
cross-examination. When these facts are "extensively and materially
false," however, and when the defendant has had no effective oppor-
tunity to challenge them, the sentence may not stand. Unfortunately,
neither of the polar cases controls the typical situation. Most frequently,
the underlying facts appear only in the presentence report; the trial
judge generally does not recite them in open court, nor do they other-
wise become part of the record. Therefore, unless the defendant and
his attorney have access to that report, they cannot know what facts
the trial judge has relied on in passing sentence. Since in many juris-
dictions the presentence report remains a secret document, the defend-
ant can rarely contest the truth of the facts that it contains.
Though many sentencing judges insist that disclosure of the con-
tents of presentence reports, even to appellate judges, "would trench
on proper judicial prerogatives,"'"" their arguments for secrecy do not
withstand analysis. Often they assert that disclosure of reports will
126. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
127. Id. at 741.
128. Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Preserved as a Confi-
dential Document, 28 FED. PROB. 3 (Mar. 1964).
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inhibit individuals from coming forward with information about the
defendant. 2 9  Those few courts that routinely disclose the factual un-
derpinnings of the sentence recommendation, however, have exper-
ienced little restriction of information. 3 ' Moreover, even if disclosure
reduced the quantity of information available, any change in the ac-
curacy of predictive judgments would depend on the quality of the in-
formation that disclosure denied the courts. If that sort of information
would tend on the whole to be less credible and relevant than informa-
tion capable of withstanding disclosure and challenge, which seems
likely, then the accuracy of the predictions might even increase as the
amount of information available to the judge decreases.
Judges have also argued that disclosure would permit counsel to
"denigrate the [experts'] submissions and recommendations.' 13' This
contention, too, lacks merit. The Supreme Court considered it in
Kent v. United States'32 and held, in the context of juvenile court
records, that it was "precisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate'" mat-
ters susceptible to challenge or impeachment. 3 3 In the last analysis,
however, fundamental fairness, rather than accuracy or efficiency, re-
quires disclosure of presentence reports. It is simply unfair for judges
to make the critical sentencing decision on the basis of ex parte informa-
tion that the defendant has had no opportunity to confront and contest.
2. Psychiatric Predictions.-Psychiatric predictions also rest on a
superstructure of underlying facts, as the case of Leroy Peterson illus-
trates.34  A policeman, while staking out an area of Boston where a
series of rapes had occurred, observed a masked man emerge from
a car and approach another car in which a couple was seated. After
the man spoke to the couple they got out with their hands up. When
the policeman attempted to intervene, a fight ensued and the masked
man fled. Shortly thereafter, the policeman attempted to arrest Mr.
Peterson as the assailant. Mr. Peterson vehemently denied the charge
and fought back. During the scuffle the officer subdued his quarry,
129. United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1960); Parsons, supra
note 128, at 4-5.
130. Lehrick, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States,
47 F.R.D. 225, 239 (1969). But see Parsons, supra note 128, at 5.
131. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S.
541 (1966).
132. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
133. Id. at 563.
134. Peterson v. Gaughan, 404 F.2d 1375 (Ist Cir.), aff'g 285 F. Supp. 377 (D.
Mass. 1968); In re Peterson, 354 Mass. 110, 236 N.E.2d 82 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Peterson, 348 Mass. 702, 205 N.E.2d 719 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909
(1966).
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but sustained a broken hand. The officer attempted to secure identifi-
cation of Peterson from the couple, but they had vanished and were
never located. Peterson was never charged with an assault on the
couple, but he did plead guilty to assault and battery with a deadly
weapon on the policeman and was sentenced to imprisonment for
five years. While serving this sentence Peterson, though never charged
with sexual misconduct, was examined by two psychiatrists who con-
cluded that he was a sexually dangerous person.
Notwithstanding the absence of charges against Peterson, the first
psychiatrist assumed that he had committed the series of rapes and
based his diagnosis on that assumption. 3 ' Adding a Kafkaesque
touch, the psychiatrist further attributed pathological significance to
Peterson's steadfast denial of any wrongdoing.-3 6 The second psychia-
trist, however, took a different tack. He diagnosed Peterson as sex-
ually dangerous on the basis of a forty-minute interview. Although
he was aware that the police suspected Peterson of several sexual as-
saults, he contended that he could safely ignore-and had in fact dis-
regarded-the truth or falsity of this suspicion in predicting Peterson's
propensity to commit sex crimes in the future.
Perhaps some extraordinarily gifted psychiatrist can predict future
behavior accurately on the basis of clinical insight gained from a brief
135. He stated, for example, that:
in July of 1962 a 24 year old girl was raped in her apartment by a masked
man who threatened to kill her baby. Now, this girl lived at 86 Washington
Avenue, Chelsea. And on that very day the subject had visited his wife at
80 Washington Avenue, Chelsea. These are the things, your Honor, we took
into consideration .... Now, we felt that despite the lack of convictions,
this man has a potential for sex crimes. The description of these offenses
are all similar. [And] we felt it was the same man because the implications
are so strong they can't be ignored.
Transcript of Proceedings at 28-29, Commonwealth v. Peterson, No. 3880 (Super. Ct.
Suffolk, Mass., Oct. 3, 1963). When cross-examined about the absence of any convic-
tion for sexual crimes, the psychiatrist turned detective responded: "[Hie has been
saved by the failure of the victims to identify him .... He was not convicted
because no one could identify him. He was masked." Id. at 32.
136. Id. at 25.
Further examples abound. See, e.g., Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Lav:
Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 SOCIAL SERv. REv. 107 (1960). Profes-
sor Allen describes the result of a California case:
A defendant was convicted of a sexual offense. Subsequently he was com-
mitted as a sexual psychopath following a psychiatric examination. In making
their diagnosis the psychiatrists assumed that the defendant had committed
the sexual acts which provided the basis for the criminal conviction. The
difficulty was that, as later established, the defendant had all along been the
victim of misidentification. Thus, the mistake as to the facts not only resulted
in an improper conviction but rendered invalid the psychiatric judgment of
the defendant's personality and propensities.
Id. at 117 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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interview or a battery of psychological tests, without regard to past
conduct. Since not all psychiatrists are so gifted, however, predictions
based on past conduct possess a far greater probability of accuracy
than those that rely only on clinical insight. Experience indicates, for ex-
ample, that those who have committed sexual assaults in the past, but
whose psychological tests appear normal, are more likely to commit
rape in the future than those whose psychological tests show a propen-
sity for violence, but who have never committed a sexual assault in the
past.137  Perhaps Peterson was the rapist and perhaps he was "saved
by the failure of the victims to identify him," as the first psychiatrist
put it. But why should this critical fact not be established in the same
manner as other critical facts, and why should the law deputize the
psychiatrist, rather than the jury, to perform this factfinding function?
B. A Catalogue of Safeguards
1. Rules of Evidence.-Not all evidentiary restrictions need auto-
matically apply to every type of predictive determination. The func-
tion of the restriction should be evaluated against the purpose of the
determination. Restrictions that reflect doubt about the accuracy of
certain types of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, should apply to pre-
dictive determinations with as much vigor as they do to postdictive de-
terminations. If the introduction of hearsay evidence would decrease
the accuracy of postdictive determinations, then it probably would have
a similar effect on the accuracy of predictive decisions. Contrast this,
however, with the prohibition against introducing evidence relating
to other crimes committed by the person on trial. The policy behind
this restriction is that when a person is charged with a given crime, the
fact finder is supposed to decide only whether he committed the speci-
fic crime of which he stands charged. The fear underlying the exclu-
sion of evidence of other crimes is that the jury will really ask itself
whether the defendant is a bad man deserving of punishment or a dan-
gerous man in need of isolation, without regard to whether he actually
committed the particular crime at issue. A long criminal record may
be relevant to whether he committed this crime, but the judgment of
137. This is one of the very few constants in the variable-ridden field of psychiatric
prediction of future criminal behavior. See S. POLLAcK, MANuAL oN THE SEX OF-
FENDER AND THE LAW § 4.3, at 190 (1972).
Professor Allen also reached this conclusion: "However advanced our techniques
for determining what an individual is, we have not yet approached the point at which
we may safely ignore what he has done. What he has done may often be the most
revealing evidence of what he is." Allen, supra note 136, at 117.
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time has been that the accuracy of determining specific charged crimes
will decrease if evidence of other crimes is admitted.138  The exception
in cases where a course of similar conduct establishes a modus operan-
di or pattern indicates that this is the restriction's primary purpose.
In those cases the evidentiary value of the other crimes is sufficiently
compelling to outweigh their possible prejudicial effect.3 9
The policies behind enforcing this rule diminish in the context
of predictive judgments. An individual's history provides an impor-
tant basis for predicting his future conduct. Thus although the risk
still exists that the fact finder will use a history of past crimes to assess
a person's "wickedness," rather than his dangerousness, the crucial
relevance of the subject's history-particularly if it involves acts similar
to those being predicted-outweighs this likely prejudice. For this
reason the restriction need not apply to predictive judgments with the
same vigor that it applies to determinations of past crimes.
Evidentiary restrictions that preserve values other than truth-
values such as privacy and dignity-present entirely different consid-
erations. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule, for example, at-
tempts to deter illegal police action. It has been argued that this ra-
tionale does not require exclusion in "civir' suits, since the police, hav-
ing no stake in the suits' outcome, would not be deterred by the exclu-
sion.140 This argument might have some force in purely private
civil proceedings, such as divorce actions. But it surely has no force
when the state is a party to the "civil" proceeding and is seeking a
sanction similar in many ways to criminal punishment. In all such
proceedings-whether labeled criminal, civil, or nonadversary-the ex-
clusionary rule should operate in exactly the same way as it does in
criminal prosecutions.
The rule excluding testimonial evidence obtained in violation of
the fifth amendment is far more complex in both purpose and scope.
Accordingly, it presents more complex questions. The fundamental
question is whether courts may compel the subject of a predictive pro-
ceeding to answer questions that, while not exposing him to ordinary
criminal prosecution, may lead to his "civil" confinement. To answer
that question courts must determine whether increasing the possibility
of civil confinement constitutes "incrimination" within the meaning of
the privilege. The fifth amendment does not apply to all sanctions.
138. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192-94 (3d ed. 1940).
139. See C. McComumcK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972).
140. See, e.g., id. at § 167.
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A person may not decline, for example, to answer a question on the
ground that it will lead to tort liability or even financial bankruptcy.
In Gault, however, the Court held that the privilege does cover "ex-
posure" to a determination of delinquency "which may lead to com-
mitment to a state institution .... "141 The Court's ambiguous
reasoning leaves open the question whether the privilege also covers
other types of civil confinements. Some narrow language suggests
a limitation to determinations of past delinquency culminating in con-
finement with criminals. Other language, however, suggests application
to any incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal"
or "civil."
Some courts have continued to hold the privilege inapplicable
to compelled civil confinements. In one New York case, decided after
Gault, the appellate division held the privilege inapplicable to an addict
commitment proceeding, which it deemed "nowise penal in nature.' '1 42
The court's logic, however, was less than compelling. "There can be
no question," it said, "if we are to have any system of compulsory treat-
ment at all, that a medical examination must be had. . . and no medi-
cal examination can be complete, or can serve any useful purpose un-
less the alleged addict responds to questions that are essential in order
to make a proper diagnosis."' 143  The Supreme Court's most recent
discussion of the issue, in the context of a defective delinquency pro-
ceeding against an inmate who refused to cooperate with his medical
examiners, explicitly left the issue open.'4
Even if the courts were ultimately to decide that the privilege ap-
plies to civil confinements, difficult problems would still remain. Con-
sider, for example, whether the privilege applies to questions put by a
psychiatrist or psychologist who claims interest not so much in the
substantive truth or falsity of the answer as in the manner with which it
141. 387 U.S. at 49.
142. In re James, 29 App. Div. 2d 72, 75, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 240 N.E.2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1968). In
reversing the court of appeals did not reach the question of fifth amendment privi-
lege; instead it relied on the violation of fourteenth amendment due process involved
in detention without notice and a hearing:
Having concluded that the temporary detention of the appellant violated his
constitutional rights, it must necessarily follow that the subsequent determina-
tion that the appellant was an addict, which was based almost entirely on in-
formation obtained during the period of illegal detention, must be set aside.
22 N.Y.2d at 553, 240 N.E.2d at 33, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
143. 29 App. Div. 2d at 77, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
144. Murel v. Baltimore Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (dismissing certiorari as im-
providently granted). See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
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is given-the affect, choice of words, or responsiveness. The cases
hold that the privilege does not apply to "nontestimonial" compelled
speech-talking for purposes of voice identification, for example1 45
-but the application of this principle to those aspects of a psychiatric
interview or psychological test that resemble "demeanor" evidence raises
far more complex issues. 146 However courts resolve them, the privi-
lege ought nonetheless to apply at least to answers whose substantive
content may lead the psychiatrist to recommend confinement.
The analogy to demeanor evidence leads directly to the second
question of whether the subject of a predictive proceeding may refuse
to testify at his trial (as may the defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion), or must take the stand and invoke the privilege only in response
to particular questions that expose him to the risk of confinement (as
must a participant in a noncriminal proceeding). This question be-
comes particularly important in civil commitment cases when the gov-
ernment calls the "patient" to the witness stand in order to demon-
strate that he is "crazy." In effect, the patient serves as an exhibit
rather than a witness, and the prosecution often asks questions designed
to provoke outbursts or expose a delusional system, rather than to in-
duce substantively incriminating answers.
2. Jury Trial.-Courts have frequently denied trial by jury in
predictive determinations such as commitment of the mentally ill and
juvenile delinquency proceedings. 147 The civil label, of course, is not
enough to support this denial, since in addition to the sixth amend-
ment, the seventh amendment requires trial by jury in "suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars . .. ",148 Moreover, historical evidence suggests that at about
the time the Constitution was adopted some colonies provided a jury
trial in noncriminal proceedings that could lead to involuntary confine-
ment.1 49 Furthermore, during that period, young persons charged with
crime were entitled to a trial by jury. 5 o Nonetheless, in McKeiver v.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
146. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
147. E.g., In re Gurland, 286 App. Div. 704, 146 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1955) (mental);
In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969)
(juvenile).
148. The Supreme Court has not, however, applied this requirement to the states.
C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FFDERAL CouRTs § 92, at 403 (2d ed. 1970).
149. See Souncns OF OuR LiBERTiES 154, 330, 356, 366, 376, 404 (J. Cooper &
R. Perry eds. 1959).
150. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682
(1908). But see In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969), appeal dismissed,
403 U.S. 926 (1971).
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Pennsylvania,"5 the Supreme Court authoritatively decided that the
Constitution did not require a jury trial in the adjudication stage of a
juvenile proceeding. The opinion's reasoning suggests that the Court
will not require a jury trial in other predictive proceedings leading to
confinement.152
Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in McKeiver, cata-
logued thirteen independent "reasons" for denying trial by jury in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. At bottom, these arguments dupli-
cate those generally made against trial by jury in criminal proceedings.
Granting the right, the Court said, "would bring along with it.. . the
traditional delay, the formality and the clamor of the adversary sys-
tem and, possibly, the public trial". 153 The Court's reasoning implies
that trial by jury would create an adversary situation where none
exists today. In truth, however, it would merely recognize the existing
adversary situation and require a time tested method of resolving that
conflict. When a white, middleclass policeman charges a sixteen-year-
old urban black with assaulting him, and the youth responds that the
policeman beat him up, the question is not whether an adversary situa-
tion exists, but how to resolve it. The Court's opinion in McKeiver
begs that important question.
If it is acknowledged that the decision to confine someone on the
basis of a prediction is a social policy judgment to be made by the
community and not the expert alone, a compelling argument emerges
supporting the right to trial by jury in preventive confinement cases.
The analogy to the criminal law is persuasive. In both instances the
legislature determines the types and degrees of harm sufficiently serious
to warrant intervention; experts often aid the fact finder in determining
whether the facts meet the legislative standard; and the fact finder
should be the jury. The need for trial by jury is particularly persua-
sive if the legislature has not really faced up---as is often the case when
confinement is based on prediction-to the social policy issue involved
in establishing standards. If these decisions about risks and freedom
are to be abdicated, in a democratic society it is better that it be abdi-
cated to a jury than to a psychiatrist or a judge. Moreover, trial by
jury requires a judicial articulation and elaboration of the criteria for
confinement. In a trial without a jury, judges often state their conclu-
151. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
152. Equal protection may, however, require a jury trial under some circumstances.
See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
153. 403 U.S. at 550.
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sions in the bare language of the statute. In a jury trial, on the other
hand, the judge must instruct the jury on the meaning of the statutory
criteria. These instructions are often appealed and this sets in mo-
tion the common law process of appellate consideration and construc-
tion of the statute's operative phrases. This healthy process has
been sorely missed in the area of preventive confinement and the
denial of trial by jury discourages its introduction.
Trial by jury also imposes a barrier to "judicial whispering," a
phenomenon that plagues predictive proceedings. Prosecutors often
manage to convey to the judge-informally and off the record-the
"real" basis for the confinement, which may often differ from the for-
mal one. But no one can whisper to the jury. The jury must be
openly and formally charged and may hear only evidence that is a mat-
ter of record. If the judge gives an improper charge or admits inad-
missible evidence, the process is subject to appellate review. Accord-
ingly, trial by jury is at least as important in predictive determinations
as in retrospective determinations.
IV. Developing Approaches
Courts have recently taken two approaches to the applicability of
procedural safeguards to predictive proceedings that, while not involv-
ing a labeling game, have generated much confusion. The first re-
volves around equal protection; the second, around the "right to treat-
ment." The equal protection approach, which the Supreme Court has
employed in several recent cases, basically requires the state to provide
identical safeguards to similarly situated individuals. Thus, for ex-
ample, if the state normally allows a jury trial at one type of predictive
proceeding that can result in involuntary hospitalization, it may not
deny trial by jury to a prison inmate who is the subject of a similar
proceeding, unless it can convince a court that the proceedings or con-
finements are distinguishable. 1 4 Since the requirement for the safe-
154. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972), where a prisoner was serving a term in the "sex deviate facility" of
the state prison in lieu of sentence. The prisoner claimed that the hearing for a
five-year renewal order after the expiration of his one-year maximum sentence was
the equivalent of a hearing for compulsory commitment under the Wisconsin Mental
Health Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.001-.50 (1957). Since Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.03
(1957) provided for the right to trial by jury in involuntary commitment proceedings, he
claimed that his deprivation of a jury trial constituted a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. The court held that the prisoner's claims were "at least substantial enough
to warrant an evidentiary hearing." 405 U.S. at 508.
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guard does not rest on due process, however, the state may choose be-
tween two options: it may authorize the safeguard for the second class of
inmates, or it may eliminate it for the first class.155  Some states,
therefore, may well respond by decreasing, rather than increasing, safe-
guards. Arguments have already been made against legislative enact-
ment of trial by jury in civil commitment proceedings in one state, on
the grounds that providing this safeguard to that class of confined in-
mates would open the door to an equal protection challenge by other
classes of confined inmates.
The "right to treatment" approach accords that right to those
whom the state has confined involuntarily, without adequate procedural
safeguards, on the grounds that only the promise of treatment justi-
fies relaxation of safeguards.156 The argument, however, begs the
central question. Both the confinement and the treatment are invol-
untary. If the inmate wanted inpatient treatment, presumably he
would volunteer for it. If he continues to oppose confinement, even
when the state assures treatment, then the proceeding remains adver-
sary. The conventional answer is that, while confinement benefits
only the state, confinement-cum-treatment benefits the inmate as well,
though he may not realize it. This logic, however, carries too far. It
could readily justify any imprisonment accompanied by treatment or
rehabilitation. Indeed, involuntary confinement coupled with involun-
tary treatment may well constitute a more significant deprivation of
liberty-at least to certain inmates-than involuntary confinement ab-
sent treatment.5 7 However courts resolve this question, it is difficult
to conceptualize an argument that would authorize fewer safeguards
when institutions provide treatment than when they do not.
A three judge federal district court recently employed a more di-
rect approach in striking down Wisconsin's commitment laws. In
Lessard v. Schmidt' 5 the court held that due process required the
state to provide the subject of civil commitment proceedings with many
of the basic constitutional safeguards required in criminal proceedings.
155. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-30 (1972).
156. For an analysis of the constitutional problems of this approach see Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
157. See, e.g., KATz, GOLDSTEiN & DESRHowrrz, supra note 32, at 713-20; Liver-
more, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 75, 92-95 (1968); cf. Haynes v. Harris, 344 F. Supp. 463 (8th Cir. 1965).
Sometimes, of course, those involuntarily committed accept or even seek treatment.
For a consideration of the difficulties in determining the voluntariness of treatment
under these circumstances, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1973, § 1, at 19, coL 1.
158. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (ED. Wis. 1972).
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Since civil commitment proceedings could result in the loss of basic
civil rights, the court held that these proceedings require, inter alia,
notice and opportunity to be heard; proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
right to counsel; privilege against self-incrimination; and exclusion of
hearsay evidence. Trial by jury was not specifically at issue, since
Wisconsin law provided that safeguard, 159 but the court did say that
a committed patient must be informed of "his right to jury trial."'16 0
The court rejected only the right of the patient to have his law-
yer accompany him at the psychiatric interview. It acknowledged that
this issue posed a difficult choice between the state's interest in an
efficient examination, which it thought the presence of counsel would
impair, and the patient's interest in properly exercising his rights of
cross-examination. Although the court recognized that the psychiatric
interview constituted a critical phase of the proceedings it struck the
balance in favor of the state. In doing so, the court neglected an-
other of the patient's interests. Not only will counsel's absence from
the psychiatric interview impair his ability to cross-examine the physi-
cians at trial, but more important, that absence will undermine the pa-
tient's acknowledged right to refuse to answer questions that might lead to
his confinement.
The arguments favoring exclusion of counsel at the psychiatric
interview are analogous to those put forward by the police in opposition
to the Miranda ruling regulating the interrogation of criminal sus-
pects. There too, the presence of counsel "severely limit[s] the effi-
cacy of the examination' 61-indeed, that is an important part of the
function of the privilege. If a patient has a privilege not to make state-
ments which might lead to a deprivation of his liberty-as the Lessard
court held-then the right to counsel's ongoing advice, whenever gov-
ernment agents question him in an in-custody setting, should follow.
The Lessard court's conclusion reaches an uncomfortable compromise,
affording the right, but denying the most effective means for its imple-
mentation.
Despite this important compromise, Lessard goes a long way
toward applying criminal law safeguards to predictive decisions that
159. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.03 (1957).
160. 349 F. Supp. at 1092. The court also observed that "[t]he right to a jury
trial has been shown to be critical, numerous studies indicating that the exercise of
that right may well mean the difference between release and confinement." Id. at
1100.
161. Id. at 1100, quoting United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir.
1968).
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may culminate in confinement. It is not clear at this juncture which
approach will dominate: equal protection, right to treatment, or due
process. It is clear, however, that courts will continue to confront these
important issues over the next generation.
V. Proportionality
Courts will also be confronted with the need to define the "sub-
stantive constitutional limitations 162 on the power to confine persons
on preventive grounds. Among other basic questions, the courts must
decide whether the Constitution requires proof of a prior act as a pre-
requisite to at least certain forms of preventive confinement. 163  The
Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California6 may be relevant
to this issue. Confused as the opinion is, its holding comes down to
prohibiting the imposition of criminal punishment for a status or a
"propensity" without proof of "irregular behavior" within the state's
jurisdiction. Of course, the Court explicitly limited its decision to
criminal punishment and took back most of what it had given by in-
viting the states to establish civil confinement programs. The Court
thus played the legal labeling game-civil versus criminal-that it
was to condemn five years later in Gault. Perhaps courts may ulti-
mately apply the Robinson rationale to at least certain kinds of preven-
tive confinement mechanisms. Some state legislatures and courts have
already begun to do so. For example, some of the recently enacted
insanity commitment laws--especially the Massachusetts 65 and Cali-
fornia 66 statutes-require that the determination of dangerousness
be tied to specific past conduct. A recent decision of the Maine
Supreme Court, too, construed a preventive juvenile confinement sta-
162. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
163. Statutes allowing the quarantine of persons afflicted with contagious diseases
would be one arguable exception to a rule forbidding preventive confinement. See,
e.g., WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 70.20.040 (1962), which provides that when a person
has been infected with a disease which the municipal officers feel is dangerous to
the public health, they may "remov[e] him or her to a separate house if it can
be done without great danger to his or her health."
Some statutes, however, do require acts manifesting an unwillingness to remain
out of public places as a prerequisite to involuntary quarantine. See, e.g., N.Y. Pun.
HA.TH LAW § 2120 (McKinney 1971), which provides that whenever a person is
infected with a communicable disease "and is unable or unwilling to conduct himself
and to live in such a manner as not to expose members of his family or household
or other persons with whom he may be associated to danger of infection," he may
be investigated and, if necessary, quarantined.
164. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
165. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (Supp. 1973).
166. CAL. WELE. & INsT'Ns CODE §§ 5300, 5304 (West Supp. 1973).
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tute to require "a pattern" of past conduct that clearly shows a "mani-
fest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality."'167
Conditioning preventive detention on proof of a specific act, and
imposing vigorous procedural safeguards at the predictive hearing
would significantly reduce the availability of the first two categories
along the preventive continuum and would eliminate some of the
worst abuses that attend those categories. The requirement of a prior
criminal act to be proved in an adversary proceeding circumscribed by
procedural safeguards would preclude the confinement of persons who
had not committed such acts, or who were merely suspected of having
committed them. These reforms, however, would leave intact the third
category, in which a proven criminal act is required to trigger confine-
ment, but in which the duration of the confinement is based on pre-
ventive considerations that include more than the past act. Thus, these
reforms would still leave open the question that divided Judges Baze-
Ion and Burger in the Cross case: whether the Constitution author-
ized the indeterminate confinement of a sex psychopath on the basis
of past acts of exhibitionism and a prediction that he will engage in
future acts of exhibitionism.
To confront this difficult problem, courts must realize that any
civilized system of justice requires a relationship between the crime
committed or predicted and the duration of the confinement author-
ized. Despite its hoary credentials, and comic potentials, the principle
of "making the punishment fit the crime" is essential in a just society.
Yet, at present, the courts have barely adumbrated this concept of pro-
portionality in the area of pure criminal punishment, and most have
rejected it entirely for civil or quasi-criminal confinements.'
In In re Lynch, 69 however, the California Supreme Court recent-
ly rendered a decision that may have broad implications for dispro-
portionate confinement of any sort. That case, like Cross, involved a
man convicted of an act of exhibitionism-a crime generally punish-
167. S****S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 569 (Me. 1973).
168. Until recently, for example, the California courts had repeatedly held that Cali-
fornia's Sexual Psychopath Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5500-22, as amended,
CAT. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-30 (West 1972), did not violate the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. As one court said:
The emphasis that appellant places on the fact that he was originally convicted
of a misdemeanor, and now finds himself in San Quentin, possibly for life, is
misplaced. The argument would be sound only were his confinement punish-
ment. The purpose of the confinement is to protect society and to try and
cure the accused.
People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897, 902 (1957).
169. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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able by a short prison term. Under the California indeterminate sen-
tence law,170 a second conviction for this offense carries an indeter-
minate sentence of one year to life. Lynch, a second offender, was so
sentenced.' In declaring his indeterminate sentence unconstitution-
ally cruel and unusual because "disproportional," the California court
noted that it "not only fail[ed] to fit the crime, it [did] not fit the
criminal .... "72 Though the decision is limited to indeterminate
sentences, its logic seems readily applicable to other forms of preven-
tive confinement.
Constructing a theory of proportionality has intrigued and eluded
mankind since the beginning of recorded history. The Biblical "eye
for an eye, tooth for a tooth" reflects at once the need for proportionality
and the difficulty of going beyond simplistic symmetry. However
difficult it is to construct a theory of proportionality for past crimes,
it is more difficult still to apply a theory of proportionality to preven-
tive confinement. To what must the duration and severity of the con-
finement be proportional? To the past harm actually caused? To the
past danger threatened? To the future harm predicted? To the actor's
culpability?
The Lynch case, and the Cross case that divided Chief Justice
Burger and Chief Judge Bazelon, were easy from the viewpoint of
proportionality. In those cases neither the past crime nor the predicted
future act warranted long term confinement: exhibitionism is just not
serious enough in an open and heterogeneous society such as ours
to warrant life imprisonment. But how would the courts have re-
sponded-indeed, how should they have responded-if respected ex-
perts had reliably predicted the defendant was very likely to engage
in future acts of rape or murder? Psychiatrists frequently make such
predictions-with little basis in fact or experience-today. Assume,
for a moment, that they could be made reliably-not with the cer-
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970). This statute provides that anyone
who is convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in any reformatory or state
prison (unless the sentence is suspended, probated, or a new trial granted) shall "be
sentenced to be imprisoned in the state prison, but the court imposing the sentence
shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment." Other sections
of the Code set out the procedures for the later review and fixing of duration of
the sentence. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203, 5077 (West Supp. 1973).
The indeterminate sentence statute itself has repeatedly withstood allegations of
unconstitutionality. See, e.g., People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020(1958).
171. 8 Cal. 3d at 413-14, 503 P.2d at 922-23, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19. His first
sentence was suspended.
172. Id. at 437, 503 P.2d at 939, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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tainty of the dangerousness meter-but with a degree of certainty ap-
proximating that which we demand of the criminal process. How
should the courts respond?
Difficult as it is, the courts must begin to develop and apply
theories of proportionality. A just society simply cannot act without
a sense of proportion when it deprives some of its citizens of their lib-
erty for the good of the rest of us. When the courts do begin to con-
front the issue of proportionality, they will, unfortunately, have little
guidance from the academy. These kinds of problems have not cap-
tured the imagination of legal scholars, and for understandable reasons.
The tools of the law-and of the law schools-are better suited to fash-
ioning procedural safeguards, than to probing philosophical questions
of just dessert. Problems of proportionality raise questions that are
eternal and unanswerable, but they are questions that every generation
must ask anew.
VT. Conclusion
This article has suggested a framework for analyzing some of the
constitutional problems-both procedural and substantive-raised by
any system of preventive confinement based on predictions of future
harm. Placing these problems in such a framework will not solve them.
It is in the nature of these problems that they are not soluble, at least
in any ultimate sense. No system of preventive confinement-even
one with precise definitions, adequate procedures, and a requirement
of past misconduct-will be free of substantial costs and sacrifices of
other important values. All that any framework can hope to do is to
help clarify and articulate the nature and extent of the values at stake.
Then the weighing process must begin; a just balance must be
struck between the legitimate interests of crime prevention and the
equally legitimate interests of individual liberty. In striking this bal-
ance, we must not forget that a sense of proportion is what separates us
from the savages.
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